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Quantitative results from a large class of structural gravity models of international trade de-
pend critically on the elasticity of trade with respect to trade frictions. We develop a new sim-
ulated method of moments estimator to estimate this elasticity from disaggregate price and
trade-ﬂow data and we use it within Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) Ricardian model. We apply
our estimator to new disaggregate price and trade-ﬂow data for 123 countries in the year 2004.
Our method yields a trade elasticity of roughly four, nearly ﬁfty percent lower than Eaton and
Kortum’s (2002) approach. Moreover, robustness exercises result in trade elasticity estimates
that are both lower and fall within a narrower range relative to the existing literature. This
difference doubles the welfare gains from international trade.
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Quantitative results from a large class of structural gravity models of international trade de-
pend critically on the elasticity of trade with respect to trade frictions.1 To illustrate how impor-
tant this parameter is, consider three examples: Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) ﬁnd that the
estimate of the tariff equivalent of the U.S.-Canada border varies between 48 and 19 percent,
depending on the assumed elasticity of trade with respect to trade frictions. Yi (2003) points
out that observed reductions in tariffs can explain almost all or none of the growth in world
trade, depending on this elasticity. Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2011) argue that
the trade elasticity is one of only two statistics needed to measure the welfare cost of autarky in
a large and important class of trade models. Therefore, this elasticity is key to understanding
the size of the frictions to trade, the response of trade to changes in tariffs, and the welfare gains
or losses from trade.
Estimating this parameter is difﬁcult because quantitative trade models can rationalize small
trade ﬂows with either large trade frictions and small elasticities, or small trade frictions and
large elasticities. Thus, one needs satisfactory measures of trade frictions independent of trade
ﬂows to estimate this elasticity. Using their Ricardian model of trade, Eaton and Kortum (2002)
(henceforth EK) provide an innovative and simple solution to this problem by arguing that,
with product-level price data, one could use the maximum price difference across goods be-
tween countries as a proxy for bilateral trade frictions. The maximum price difference between
two countries is meaningful because it is bounded by the trade friction between the two coun-
tries via simple no-arbitrage arguments.
We develop a new simulated method of moments estimator for the elasticity of trade incor-
porating EK’s intuition. Our argument for a new estimator is that EK’s method understates
the true trade friction and results in estimates of the trade elasticity that are biased upward by
economically signiﬁcant magnitudes. Thus, we propose a new methodology, which is subject
to the same data requirements as EK’s approach, and we use it within the Ricardian model in
order to correct the bias and arrive at a new estimate for the elasticity of trade.
We apply our estimator to disaggregate price and trade-ﬂow data for the year 2004, which
spans 123 countries that account for 98 percent of world output. Our benchmark estimate for
the elasticity of trade is 4.12, rather than approximately eight, as EK’s estimation strategy sug-
gests. This difference doubles the measured welfare gains from trade across various models.
Since the elasticity of trade plays a key role in quantifying the welfare gains from trade, it is
important to understand why our estimates of the parameter differ substantially from EK’s.
1The class of models includes Krugman (1980), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Eaton and Kortum (2002),
and Melitz (2003) as articulated in Chaney (2008), which all generate log-linear relationships between bilateral
trade ﬂows and trade frictions.
1We show that the reason behind the difference is that their estimator is biased in ﬁnite samples
of price data. The bias arises because the model’s equilibrium no-arbitrage conditions imply
that the maximum operator over a ﬁnite sample of prices underestimates the trade cost with
positive probability and overestimates the trade cost with zero probability. Consequently, the
maximum price difference lies strictly below the true trade cost, in expectation. This implies
that EK’s estimator delivers an elasticity of trade that lies strictly above the true parameter, in
expectation. As the sample size grows to inﬁnity, EK’s estimator can uncover the true elasticity
of trade, which necessarily implies that the bias in the estimates of the parameter is eliminated.
Quantitatively, the bias is substantial. To illustrate its severity, we discretize EK’s model, simu-
late trade ﬂows and product-level prices under an assumed elasticity of trade, and apply their
estimating approach on artiﬁcial data. Assuming a trade elasticity of 8.28—EK’s preferred esti-
mate for 19 OECDcountries in 1990—EK’sprocedure yieldsan elasticity estimate of 12.5, which
is nearly 50-percent higher than originally postulated. Moreover, in practice, the true parameter
can be recovered when 50,000 goods are sampled across the 19 economies, which constitutes an
extreme data requirement to produce unbiased estimates of the elasticity of trade.
Based on these arguments, we propose an estimator that is applicable when the sample size of
prices is small. Our approach builds on our insight that one can use observed bilateral trade
ﬂows to recover all sufﬁcient parameters to simulate EK’s model and to obtain trade ﬂows
and prices as functions of the parameter of interest. This insight then suggests a simulated
method of moments estimator that minimizes the distance between the moments obtained by
applying EK’s approach on real and artiﬁcial data. We explore the properties of this estimator
numerically using simulated data and we show that it can uncover the true elasticity of trade.
Applying our estimator to alternative data sets and conducting several robustness exercises
allows us to establish a range for the elasticity of trade between 2.47 and 5.51. In contrast, EK’s
approach would have found a range of 4.17 to 9.6. Thus, our method ﬁnds elasticities that are
roughly half the size of EK’s approach. Because the inverse of this elasticity linearly controls
changes inreal income necessary to compensate arepresentative consumer for going toautarky,
our estimates double the measured welfare gains from trade relative to previous ﬁndings.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a trade-elasticity estimation ap-
proach that is applicable to various existing models of international trade. The methodology
and the moments that we use to estimate the trade elasticity within the Ricardian framework
can be derived for other trade models with micro-level heterogeneity. In Simonovska and
Waugh (2011), we illustrate this point by showing how the estimation strategy introduced in
this paper applies to models with variable mark-ups, such as Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kor-
tum (2003), and models that build on the monopolistic-competition structure of Melitz (2003),
as articulated in Chaney (2008). Thus, while we focus on the particulars of EK’s Ricardian
2model and our method’s relationship with EK’s approach, our methodology contributes to the
estimation of trade elasticities above and beyond a particular model.
Second, our ﬁndings suggest both a lower and narrower range for the trade elasticity relative
to the existing literature. In particular, EK establish a range for the elasticity estimate between
3.6 and 12.8, with their benchmark strategy yielding values in the middle of this range. Our
critique applies to the strategy that EK follow in order to obtain the estimate of 12.8 as well.
When we apply our estimator to EK’s alternative approach, we obtain an estimate of 4.4, which
is nearly the same as our benchmark ﬁnding. Thus, we provide a lower and narrower range of
2.47 to 5.51, relative to EK’s estimates.
In addition, the range of estimates that we provide is narrower and lower relative to the range
that Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) establish. The authors survey the literature that esti-
mates the trade elasticity using various approaches and they establish a range between ﬁve and
ten. One set of estimates that Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) document is obtained using
data on changes in bilateral trade ﬂows and tariffs during trade liberalization episodes, as in
Head and Ries (2001), Romalis (2007), and Caliendo and Parro (2011). The approach typically
associates the entire change in trade ﬂows during a trade liberalization with changes in tar-
iffs. This necessarily results in high estimates of the trade elasticity, since changes in non-tariff
barriers that occur during trade liberalizations are not accounted for in the estimation. More-
over, this approach is subject to a large data requirement, so it typically focuses on a particular
episode that involves a handful of countries. In contrast, using our methodology, we provide
estimates for the trade elasticity from data that spans as many as 123 countries, which account
for 98 percent of world output.
Another set of estimates that Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report is obtained using Feen-
stra’s(1994)methodology. However, inheterogeneous frameworksthatrelyon constant-elasticity-
of-substitution (CES) preferences, such as EK’s Ricardian model, Feenstra’s (1994) method can-
not recover the elasticity of trade. To demonstrate this fact, we apply Feenstra’s (1994) method
to data generated from the Ricardian model. We ﬁnd that the method recovers the preference
parameter that controls the elasticity of substitution across goods. This parameter plays no role
in determining aggregate trade ﬂows and welfare gains from trade in the Ricardian model.
To summarize, in this paper, we develop a new methodology to estimate the elasticity of trade
that is applicable across gravity-based models of international trade that feature micro-level
heterogeneity. We apply our estimator to novel disaggregate price and trade-ﬂow data for
the year 2004, which spans 123 countries that account for 98 percent of world output. Across
numerous exercises, we obtain estimates of the trade elasticity that are both lower and fall
within anarrower rangerelative totheexisting literature. Ourﬁndingsimplythatthe measured
welfare gains from international trade are twice as high as previously documented.
32. Model
We outline the environment of the multi-country Ricardian model of trade introduced by EK.
We consider a world with N countries, where each country has a tradable ﬁnal-goods sector.
There is a continuum of tradable goods indexed by j ∈ [0,1].
Within each country i, there is a measure of consumers Li. Each consumer has one unit of
time supplied inelastically in the domestic labor market and enjoys the consumption of a CES
bundle of ﬁnal tradable goods with elasticity of substitution ρ > 1:
Ui =








To produce quantity xi(j) in country i, a ﬁrm employs labor using a linear production function
with productivity zi(j). Country i’s productivity is, in turn, the realization of a random variable




The country-speciﬁc parameter Ti > 0 governs the location of the distribution; higher values
of it imply that a high productivity draw for any good j is more likely. The parameter θ > 1
is common across countries and, if higher, it generates less variability in productivity across
goods.
Having drawn a particular productivity level, a perfectly competitive ﬁrm from country i in-
curs a marginal cost to produce good j of wi/zi(j), where wi is the wage rate in the economy.
Shipping the good to a destination n further requires a per-unit iceberg trade cost of τni > 1 for
n  = i, with τii = 1. We assume that cross-border arbitrage forces effective geographic barriers
to obey the triangle inequality: For any three countries i,k,n, τni ≤ τnkτki.
Below, we describe equilibrium prices, trade ﬂows, and welfare.
Perfect competition forces the price of good j from country i to destination n to be equal to the





So, consumers in destination n would pay pni(j), should they decide to buy good j from i.
Consumers purchase good j from the low-cost supplier; thus, the actual price consumers in n







The pricing rule and the productivity distribution allow us to obtain the following CES exact

















   1
1−ρ is the Gamma function, and parameters are restricted
such that θ > ρ − 1.
To calculate trade ﬂows between countries, let Xn be country n’s expenditure on ﬁnal goods, of
which Xni is spent on goods from country i. Since there is a continuum of goods, computing the
fraction of income spent on imports from i, Xni/Xn, can be shown to be equivalent to ﬁnding
the probability that country i is the low-cost supplier to country n given the joint distribution
of efﬁciency levels, prices, and trade costs for any good j. The expression for the share of







Expressions (3) and (4) allow us to relate trade shares to trade costs and the price indices of each
















Xi is country i’s expenditure share on goods from country i, or its home trade share.
In this model, it is easy to show that the welfare gains from trade are essentially captured
by changes in the CES price index that a representative consumer faces. Because of the tight
link between prices and trade shares, this model generates the following relationship between













where the left-hand side can be interpreted as the percentage compensation a representative
consumer in country n requires to move between two trading equilibria.
5Expression (5) is not particular to EK’s model. Several popular models of international trade
relate trade shares, prices and trade costs in the same exact manner. These models include the
Armington framework of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and the monopolistic competition
framework of Krugman (1980). More importantly for the context of this paper, the heteroge-
neous Ricardian framework of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and the model of
ﬁrm heterogeneity by Melitz (2003), when parametrized as in Chaney (2008), also generate this
relationship. Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2011) show how equation (6) arises in
all of these models.
2.1. The Elasticity of Trade
The key parameter determining trade ﬂows (equation (5)) and welfare (equation (6)) is θ. To






= −θ[log(τni) − log(Pi) + log(Pn)]. (7)
As this expression makes clear, θ controls how a change in the bilateral trade costs, τni, will
change bilateral trade between two countries. This elasticity is important because if one wants
to understand how a bilateral trade agreement will impact aggregate trade or to simply under-
stand the magnitude of the trade friction between two countries, then a stand on this elasticity
is necessary. This is what we mean by the elasticity of trade.
To see the parameter’s importance for welfare, it is easy to demonstrate that (6) implies that θ










Hence, decreasing the domestic expenditure share by one percent generates a (1/θ)/100-percent
increase in consumer welfare. Thus, in order to measure the impact of trade policy on welfare,
it is sufﬁcient to obtain data on realized domestic expenditures and an estimate of the elasticity
of trade.
Given θ’s impact on trade ﬂows and welfare, this elasticity is absolutely critical in any quanti-
tative study of international trade.
3. Estimating θ: EK’s Approach
Equation (5) suggests that one could easily estimate θ if one had data on trade shares, aggregate
prices, and trade costs. The key issue is that trade costs are not observed. In this section, we
discuss how EK approximate trade costs and estimate θ. Then, we characterize the statistical
6properties of EK’s estimator. The key result is Proposition 1, which states that their estimator
is biased and overestimates the elasticity of trade with a ﬁnite sample of prices. The second
result is Proposition 2, which states that EK’s estimator is a consistent and an asymptotically
unbiased estimator of the elasticity of trade.
3.1. Approximating Trade Costs
The main problem with estimating θ is that one must disentangle θ from trade costs, which are
not observed. EKpropose approximating trade costs using disaggregateprice information across
countries. In particular, the maximum price difference across goods between two countries
bounds the bilateral trade cost, which solves the indeterminacy issue.
To illustrate this argument, suppose that we observe the price of good ℓ across locations, but
we do not know its country of origin.2 We know that the price of good ℓ in country n relative to




That is, the relative price of good ℓ must be less than or equal to the trade friction. This inequal-
ity must hold because if it does not, then pn(ℓ) > τnipi(ℓ) and an agent could import ℓ at a
lower price. Thus, the inequality in (9) places a lower bound on the trade friction.
Improvements on this bound are possible if we observe a sample of L goods across locations.








This suggests a way to exploit disaggregate price information across countries and to arrive at
an estimate of τni by taking the maximum of relative prices over goods. Thus, EK approximate
τni, in logs, by
log ˆ τni(L) = max
ℓ∈L
{log(pn(ℓ)) − log(pi(ℓ))}, (11)
where the “hat” denotes the approximated value of τni and (L) indexes its dependence on the
sample size of prices.
2This is the most common case, though Donaldson (2009) exploits a case where he knows the place of origin
for one particular good, salt. He argues convincingly that in India, salt was produced in only a few locations and
exported everywhere; thus, the relative price of salt across locations identiﬁes the trade friction.
73.2. Estimating the Elasticity
Given the approximation of trade costs, EK derive an econometric model that corresponds
to (7). For a sample of L goods, they estimate a parameter, β, using a method of moments
estimator, which takes the ratio of the average of the left-hand side of (7) to the average of the
term in the square bracket of the right-hand side of (7), where the averages are computed across
all country pairs.3 Mathematically, their estimator is:














log ˆ τni(L) + log ˆ Pi − log ˆ Pn
 , (12)
where log ˆ τni(L) = max
ℓ∈L
{logpn(ℓ) − logpi(ℓ)},






The value of β is EK’s preferred estimate of the elasticity θ.4 Throughout, we will denote by
ˆ β the estimator deﬁned in equation (12) to distinguish it from the value θ. As discussed, the
second line of expression (12) approximates the trade cost. The third line approximates the
aggregate price indices. The top line represents a rule that combines these statistics, together
with observed trade ﬂows, in an attempt to estimate the elasticity of trade.
3.3. Properties of EK’s Estimator
Before describing the properties of the estimator ˆ β, we want to be clear about the sources of
error in equation (12). Bilateral trade ﬂows are observable statistics. Trade barriers and price
indices are approximated from price data using the last two equations in (12). Hence, they are
potentially measured with error because of the approximation. In the model, prices are realiza-
tions of random variables, thus we treat the micro-level prices as being randomly sampled from
the equilibrium distribution of prices. This allows us to theoretically characterize the properties
of the approximation error and in turn to derive the properties of the estimator ˆ β in (12).5
Given our assumption that the prices are randomly sampled from the equilibrium distribution,
we deﬁne the following objects.
3They also propose two other estimators. One uses the approximation in (11) and the gravity equation in (21).
We show in Appendix C that our arguments are applicable to this approach as well. The other approach does not
use disaggregate price data and we discuss it later.
4To alleviate measurement error, EK use the second-order statistic over price differences rather than the ﬁrst-
order statistic. Our estimation approach is robust to either speciﬁcation.
5In practice, there may be other sources of measurement error in the data which are outside of the model. We
discuss these issues in Section 7.2.
8Deﬁnition 1 Deﬁne the following objects:
1. Let ǫni = θ[logpn − logpi] be the log price difference of a good between country n and country i,
multiplied by θ.





3. Let the vector ˜ τi = {θlog(τi1),...,θlog(τiN)} and let ˜ τ be a matrix with typical row, ˜ τi.
4. Let g(pi;S, ˜ τi) be the pdf of prices of individual goods in country i, pi ∈ (0,∞).
5. Let fmax(ǫni;L,S, ˜ τi, ˜ τn) be the pdf of max(ǫni), given prices of a sample L ≥ 1 of goods.






The ﬁrst item is simply the scaled log price difference. As we show in Appendix 2.1, this hap-
pens to be convenient to work with, as the second line in (12) can be restated in terms of scaled
log price differences across locations. The second item is a vector in which each element is a
function of a country’s technology parameter and wage rate. The third item is a matrix of log
bilateral trade costs, scaled by θ, with a typical vector row containing the trade costs that coun-
try i’s trading partners incur to sell there. The fourth item speciﬁes the probability distribution
of prices in each country. The ﬁfth item speciﬁes the probability distribution over the maximum
scaled log price difference and its dependence on the sample size of prices of L goods. We de-
rive this distribution in Appendix 2.1. Finally, the sixth item summarizes trade data, which we
view as observable statistics.
3.4. ˆ β is a Biased Estimator of θ
Given these deﬁnitions, we establish two intermediate results and then state Proposition 1,
which characterizes the expectation of ˆ β, shows that the estimator is biased and discusses the
reason why the bias arises. The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix 2.1.
The ﬁrst intermediate result is the following:
Lemma 1 Consider an economy of N countries with a sample of L goods’ prices observed. The expected
value of the maximal difference of logged prices for a pair of countries is strictly less than the true trade
cost,
Ψni(L;S, ˜ τi, ˜ τn) ≡
1
θ
  θ log(τni)
−θlog(τin)
ǫnifmax(ǫni;L,S, ˜ τi, ˜ τn)dǫni < log(τni). (13)
9The difference in the expected values of logged prices for a pair of countries equals the difference in the
price parameters, Φ, of the two countries,
Ωni(S, ˜ τn, ˜ τi) ≡
  ∞
0
log(pn)g(pn;S, ˜ τn)dpn −
  ∞
0
log(pi)g(pi;S, ˜ τi)dpi =
1
θ
(logΦi − logΦn), (14)
with Φn deﬁned in equation (3).
The key result in Lemma 1 is the strict inequality in (13). It says that Ψni, the expected maximal
log price difference, is less than the true log trade cost. Two forces drive this result. First, with
a ﬁnite sample L of prices, there is positive probability that the maximal log price difference
will be less than the true log trade cost. In other words, there is always a chance that the
weak inequality in (11) does not bind. Second, there is zero probability that the maximal log
price difference can be larger than the true log trade cost. This comes from optimality and the
deﬁnition ofequilibrium. Thesetwoforces implythattheexpected maximallogpricedifference
lies strictly below the true log trade cost.
The second result in Lemma 1 is that the difference in the expected log prices in expression (14)
equals the difference in the aggregate price parameters deﬁned in equation (3). This result is
important because it implies that any source of bias in the estimator ˆ β does not arise because of
systematic errors in approximating the price parameter Φ.
The next intermediate step computes the expected value of 1/ˆ β. This step isconvenient because
the inverse of ˆ β is linear in the random variables that Lemma 1 characterizes.
Lemma 2 Consider an economy of N countries with a sample of L goods’ prices observed. The expected






















































This results says that the expected value of the inverse of ˆ β equals the inverse of the elasticity
multiplied by the bracketed term of (16). The bracketed term is the expected maximal log price
difference minus the difference in expected log prices, both scaled by theta, and divided by
trade data. This term is strictly less than one because Ψni does not equal the log trade cost, as
established in Lemma 1. IfΨni did equalthe log trade cost, then the bracketed term would equal
10one, and the expected value of the inverse of ˆ β would be equal to the inverse of θ. This can be
seen by examining the relation between Φ’s and aggregate prices P’s in (3), and by substituting
expression (7) into (16).
Inverting (15) and then applying Jensen’s inequality establishes the main result: EK’s estimator
is biased above the true value of θ.
Proposition 1 Consider an economy of N countries with a sample of L goods’ prices observed. The


























The proposition establishes that the estimator ˆ β provides estimates that exceed the true value
of the elasticity θ. The weak inequality in (17) comes from applying Jensen’s inequality to the
strictly convex function of ˆ β, 1/ˆ β. The strict inequality follows from Lemma 1, which argued
that the expected maximal logged price difference is strictly less than the true trade cost. Thus,
the bracketed term in expression (17) is always greater than one and the elasticity of trade is
always overestimated.
3.5. Consistency and Asymptotic Bias
While the estimator ˆ β is biased in a ﬁnite sample, the asymptotic properties of EK’s estimator
are worth understanding. Proposition 2 summarizes the result. The proof to Proposition 2 can
be found in Appendix 2.2.
Proposition 2 Consider an economy of N countries. The maximal log price difference is a consistent





(logpn(ℓ) − logpi(ℓ)) = logτni. (18)
The estimator ˆ β is a consistent estimator of θ,
plim
L→∞
ˆ β (L;S, ˜ τ,X) = θ, (19)





ˆ β (L;S, ˜ τ,X)
 
− θ = 0. (20)
11There are three elementsto Proposition 2, eachbuilding on the previous one. The ﬁrst statement
says that the probability limit of the maximal log price difference equals the true log trade
cost between two countries. Intuitively, this says that as the sample size becomes large, the
probability that the weak inequality in (10) does not bind becomes vanishingly small.
The second statement says that the estimator ˆ β converges in probability to the elasticity of
trade—i.e., ˆ β is a consistent estimator of θ. The reasons are the following. Because the maximal
log price difference converges in probability to the true log trade cost, and the difference in
averages of log prices converges in probability to the difference in log price parameters, 1/ˆ β
converges in probability to 1/θ. Since 1/ˆ β is a continuous function of ˆ β (with ˆ β > 0), ˆ β must
converge inprobability toθ becauseofthe preservation ofconvergence forcontinuous functions
(see Hayashi (2000)).
The third statement says that, in the limit, the bias is eliminated. This follows immediately
from the argument that ˆ β is a consistent estimator of θ (see Hayashi (2000)).
The results in Proposition 2 are important for two reasons. First, they suggest that with enough
data, EK’s estimator provides informative estimates of the elasticity of trade. However, as we
will show in the next section, Monte Carlo exercises suggest that the data requirements are
extreme. Second, because EK’s estimator has desirable asymptotic properties, it underlies the
simulation-based estimator that we develop in Section 5.
4. How Large is the Bias? How Much Data is Needed?
Proposition 1 shows that EK’s estimator is biased in a ﬁnite sample. Many estimators have this
property, which raises the question: How large is the bias? Furthermore, even if the magnitude
of the bias is large, perhaps moderate increases in the sample size are sufﬁcient to eliminate the
bias (in practical terms). The natural question is: How much data are needed to achieve that?
To answer these questions, we perform Monte Carlo experiments in which we simulate trade
ﬂows and samples of micro-level prices under a known θ. Then, we apply EK’s estimator (and
other estimators) to the artiﬁcial data. To simulate trade ﬂows that mimic the data, we use
the simulation procedure that is described in Steps 1-3 in Section 5.2 below. We estimate all
the parameters necessary to simulate the model (except for θ) using the trade data from EK.
We set the true value of θ equal to 8.28, which is EK’s estimate when employing the approach
described above. We then randomly sample prices from the simulated data and we apply EK’s
estimation to the simulated trade ﬂows and prices. The sample size of prices is set to L = 50,
which is the number of prices EK had access to in their data set.
Table 1 summarizes our ﬁndings. The columns of Table 1 present the mean and median esti-
matesofβ over100simulations. Therows presenttwodifferentestimation approaches: method
12Table 1: Monte Carlo Results, True θ = 8.28
Approach Mean Estimate of θ (S.E.) Median Estimate of θ
EK’s Estimator 12.5 (0.06) 12.5
Least Squares 11.8 (0.06) 11.8
True Mean τ = 1.79 Estimated Mean τ = 1.48
Note: S.E. is the standard error of the mean. In each simulation there are 19 countries and
500,000 goods. Only 50 realized prices are randomly sampled and used to estimate θ. 100
simulations performed.
of moments and least squares with suppressed constant. Also reported are the true average
trade cost and the estimated average trade cost using maximal log price differences.
The ﬁrst row in Table 1 shows that the estimates using EK’s approach are larger than the true θ
of 8.28, which is consistent with Proposition 1. The key source of bias in Proposition 1 was that
the estimates of the trade costs were biased downward, as Lemma 1 argued. The ﬁnal row in
Table 1 illustrates that the estimated trade costs are below the true trade costs, where the latter
correspond to an economy characterized by a true elasticity of trade among 19 OECD countries
of 8.28.
The second row in Table 1 reports results using a least squares estimator with the constant
suppressed rather than the method of moments estimator.6 Similar to the method of moments
estimates, the least squares estimates are substantially larger than the true value of θ. This is
important because it suggests that the key problem with EK’s approach is not the method of
moment estimator per se, but, instead, the poor approximation of the trade costs.
The ﬁnal point to note is that the magnitude of the bias is substantial. The underlying θ was set
equal to 8.28, and the estimates in the simulation are between 11.8 and 12.5. Equation (8) can
be used to formulate the welfare cost of the bias. It suggests that the welfare gains from trade
will be underestimated by 50 percent as a result of the bias.
While Table 1 reﬂects the results from a particular calibration of the model to trade ﬂow data,
one would like to know how these results depend on the particulars of the economy like trade
costs. Inspection of (15) and the integral in (13) shows that the bias will depend on trade ﬂows
and the level of trade costs in the economy. For example, as all trade costs approach one, the
6We have found that including a constant in least squares results in slope coefﬁcients that either underestimate
or overestimate the elasticity depending on the level of trade costs in the simulation. Hence, including a constant
term does not resolve the bias.
13bias will disappear holding ﬁxed the sample size of prices. The reason is that as trade costs
approach one, all goods become traded and hence the maximal price difference—even in a
small sample—will likely reﬂect the true trade friction.



























Figure 1: EK’s Estimator and the Level of Trade Costs, True θ = 8.28
Figure 1 shows how the bias behaves when trade costs are increasing away from one and the
economy approaches autarky. To generate this ﬁgure, we keep the true θ equal to 8.28 and we
uniformly scale the trade costs from the baseline simulation up or down. We then apply EK’s
estimation approach to the simulated data (now indexed by the level of trade costs) with the
sample size of prices set equal to 50. The x-axis reports the average trade cost across all the
countries and the y-axis reports the associated estimate of θ.
Figure 1 shows that, as trade costs increase, EK’s estimate of θ increases and hence the bias
increases. For example, when the average trade cost equals about three, EK’s estimate of θ is
16—almost two times larger than the true θ of 8.28. In contrast, in the baseline simulation when
average trade costs are about 1.8, EK’s estimate is only ﬁfty percent larger at 12.5. The intuition
for this outcome is straightforward. As trade costs increase, more goods are likely to become
non-traded and hence it is more likely that many of the prices in the sample are not informative
about trade costs.
How much data is needed to eliminate the bias? Table 2 provides a quantitative answer. It
performs the same Monte Carlo experiments described above, as the sample size of micro-level
prices varies.
14Table 2: Increasing the Sample of Prices Reduces the Bias, True θ = 8.28
Sample Size of Prices Mean θ (S.E.) Median θ Mean τ
50 12.51 (0.06) 12.50 1.48
500 9.34 (0.02) 9.32 1.68
5,000 8.43 (0.01) 8.43 1.77
50,000 8.30 (0.002) 8.30 1.78
Note: S.E. is the standard error of the mean. In each simulation, there are 19 countries and
500,000 goods. The results reported use least squares with the constant suppressed. 100 simu-
lations performed. True Mean τ = 1.79.
Table 2 shows that, as the sample size becomes larger, the estimate of θ becomes less biased and
begins to approach the true value of θ. The ﬁnal column shows how the reduction in the bias
coincides with the estimates of the trade costs becoming less biased. This is consistent with the
arguments of Proposition 2, which describes the asymptotic properties of this estimator.
We should note that the rate of convergence is extremely slow; even with a sample size of
5,000, the estimate of β is meaningfully larger than the value generating the data. Only when
50,000 prices are sampled does the estimate approach the true value. The exercise allows us to
conclude that the data requirements to minimize the bias in estimates of the elasticity of trade
(in practice) are extreme. This motivates our alternative estimation strategy in the next section.
5. A New Approach To Estimating θ
In this section, we develop a new approach to estimating θ and we discuss its performance on
simulated data.
5.1. The Idea
Our idea is to exploit the structure of the model as follows. First, in Section 5.2, we show how
to recover all the parameters that are needed to simulate the model up to the unknown scalar θ
from trade data only. These parameters are the vector S and the scaled trade costs in matrix ˜ τ.
Given these values, we can simulate moments from the model as functions of θ.
Second, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 actually suggest which moments are informative. Inspection
of the integral (13) and the density fmax in (b.28) leads to the observation that the expected
maximal log price difference monotonically varies with θ and linearly with 1/θ. This follows
because of the previous point—the vector S and scaled log trade costs ˜ τ are pinned down by
trade data, and these values completely determine all parameters in the integral (13), except
the value 1/θ lying outside the integral. Similarly, the integral (14) is completely determined by
15these values and scaled in the same way by 1/θ as (13) is.
These observations have the following implication. While the maximum log price difference is
biased below the true trade cost, if θ is large, then the value of the maximum log price differ-
ence will be small. Similarly, if θ is small, then the value of the maximum log price difference
will be large. A large or small maximum log price difference will result in a small or large esti-
mate of β. This suggests that the estimator ˆ β will vary monotonically with the true value of θ.
Furthermore, this suggests that β is an informative moment with regard to θ.7
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Figure 2: Schematic of Estimation Approach
Figure 2 quantitatively illustrates this intuition by plotting β(θ) from simulations as we varied
θ. It is clear that β is a biased estimator because these values do not lie on the 45o line. However,
β varies near linearly with θ. These observations suggest an estimation procedure that matches
the data moment β to the moment β(θ) implied by the simulated model under a known θ.8
Because of the monotonicity implied by our arguments, the known θ must be the unique value
that satisﬁes the moment condition speciﬁed.
5.2. Simulation Approach
In this subsection, we show how to recover all parameters of interest up to the unknown scalar
θ from trade data only, and then we describe our simulation approach. This provides the foun-
dation for the simulated method of moments estimator that we propose.
7Lemma1establishedthattheexpectedvalueof1/ˆ β isproportional to1/θ. Hence,modulo effectsfromJensen’s
inequality, this suggests that ˆ β is roughly proportional to θ. Figure 2 conﬁrms this.
8Another reason for using the moment β is that ˆ β is a consistent estimator of θ, as argued in Proposition 2.
16Step 1.—We estimate the parameters for the country-speciﬁc productivity distributions and
trade costs from bilateral trade-ﬂow data. We follow closely the methodologies proposed by
EK and Waugh (2010b). First, we derive the gravity equation from expression (4) by dividing






= Si − Sn − θlogτni, (21)






and is the same value in the parameter vector S in Deﬁnition
1. Note that (21) is a different equation than expression (5), which is derived by dividing the
bilateral trade share by the exporting country’s home trade share, and is used to estimate θ. Si’s
are recovered as the coefﬁcients on country-speciﬁc dummy variables given the restrictions on
how trade costs can covary across countries. Following the arguments of Waugh (2010b), trade
costs take the following functional form:
log(τni) = dk + bni + exi + νni. (22)
Here, trade costs are a logarithmic function of distance, where dk with k = 1,2,...,6 is the
effect of distance between country i and n lying in the k-th distance interval.9 bni is the effect
of a shared border in which bni = 1 if country i and n share a border and zero otherwise.
The term exi is an exporter ﬁxed effect and allows for the trade-cost level to vary depending
upon the exporter. We assume that νni reﬂects other factors and is orthogonal to the regressors
and normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σν. We use least squares to
estimate equations (21) and (22).
Step 2.—The parameter estimates obtained from the ﬁrst-stage gravity regression are sufﬁcient
to simulate trade ﬂows and micro-level prices up to a constant, θ.
The relationship is obvious in the estimation of trade barriers since log(τni) is scaled by θ in (21).
To see that we can simulate micro-level prices as a function of θ only, notice that for any good j,
pni(j) = τniwi/zi(j). Thus, rather than simulating productivities, it is sufﬁcient to simulate the








, with ˜ Si = exp(Si) = Tiw
−θ
i . (23)
Thus, havingobtained the coefﬁcients Si from the ﬁrst-stage gravity regression, wecansimulate
the inverse of marginal costs and prices.
9Intervals are in miles: [0,375); [375,750); [750,1500); [1500,3000); [3000,6000); and [6000,maximum]. An
alternative to specifying a trade-cost function is to recover scaled trade costs as a residual using equation (5), trade
data, and measures of aggregate prices as in Waugh (2010a).
17Tosimulatethe model, weassumethatthere arealarge number(150,000)ofpotentiallytradable
goods. In Section 7.1, we discuss how we made this choice and the motivation behind it. For
each country, the inverse marginal costs are drawn from the country-speciﬁc distribution (23)
and assigned to each good. Then, for each importing country and each good, the low-cost
supplier across countries is found, realized prices are recorded, and aggregate bilateral trade
shares are computed.
Step 3.—From the realized prices, a subset of goods common to all countries is deﬁned and
the subsample of prices is recorded – i.e., we are acting as if we were collecting prices for the
international organization that collects the data. We added disturbances to the predicted trade
shares with the disturbances drawn from a mean zero normal distribution with the standard
deviation set equal to the standard deviation of the residuals from Step 1.
These steps then provide us with an artiﬁcial data set of micro-level prices and trade shares that
mimic their analogs in the data. Given this artiﬁcial data set, we can then compute moments—
as functions of θ—and compare them to the moments in the data.
5.3. Estimation
We perform two estimations: an overidentiﬁed procedure with two moments and an exactly
identiﬁed procedure with one moment. Below, we describe the moments we try to match and
the details of our estimation procedure.
Moments. Deﬁne ˆ βk as EK’s method of moment estimator deﬁned in (12) using the kth-order
















ni(L) + log ˆ Pi − log ˆ Pn
 , k = 1,2 (24)
where ˆ τk
ni(L) is computed as the kth-order statistic over L micro-level price differences between
countries n and i. In the exactly identiﬁed estimation, we use β1 as the only moment.
We denote the simulated moments by β1(θ,us) and β2(θ,us), which come from the analogous
formula asin (24)and are estimated from artiﬁcial data generated by following Steps 1-3 above.
Note that these moments are a function of θ and depend upon a vector of random variables us
associated with a particular simulation s. There are three components to this vector. First, there
are the random productivity drawsforproduction technologies for eachgood andeach country.
The second component is the set of goods sampled from all countries. The third component
mimics the residuals νni from equation (21), which are described in Section 5.2.


















Estimation Procedure. We base our estimation procedure on the moment condition:
E [y(θo)] = 0,
where θo is the true value of θ. Thus, our simulated method of moments estimator is:
ˆ θ = argmin
θ
[y(θ)
′ W y(θ)], (26)
where W is a 2 × 2 weighting matrix that we discuss below.
The idea behind this moment condition is that, though β1 and β2 will be biased away from θ,
the moments β1(θ,us) and β2(θ,us) will be biased by the same amount when evaluated at θo,
in expectation. Viewed in this language, our moment condition is closely related to the estima-
tion of bias functions discussed in MacKinnon and Smith (1998) and to indirect inference, as
discussed in Smith (2008). The key issue in MacKinnon and Smith (1998) is how the bias func-
tion behaves. As we argued in Section 5.1, the bias is monotonic in the parameter of interest.
Furthermore, Figure 2 shows that the bias is basically linear, so it is well behaved.
For the weighting matrix, we use the optimal weighting matrix suggested by Gouri´ eroux and
Monfort (1996) for simulated method of moments estimators. Because the weighting matrix
depends on our estimate of θ, we use a standard iterative procedure outlined in the next steps.
Step 4.—We make an initial guess of the weighting matrix W
0 and solve for ˆ θ0. Then, given this
value we simulate the model to generate a new estimate of the weighting matrix.10 With the
newestimateofthe weightingmatrixwe solve foranew ˆ θ1. Weperform thisiterative procedure
until our estimates of the weighting matrix and ˆ θ converge. We explicitly consider simulation
error because we utilize the weighting matrix suggested by Gouri´ eroux and Monfort (1996).
Step 5.—We compute standard errors using a bootstrap technique. We compute residuals from
the data and the ﬁtted values obtained using the estimates in (24), we resample the residuals
with replacement, and we generate a new set of data using the ﬁtted values. Using the data
constructed from each resampling b, we computed new estimates βb
1 and βb
2.
For each bootstrap b, we replace the moments β1 and β2 with bootstrap-generated moments
βb
1 and βb
2. To account for simulation error, a new seed is set to generate a new set of model-
10The computation of this matrix is described in Gouri´ eroux and Monfort (1996).
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This procedure for constructing standard errors is similar in spirit to the approach of Eaton,
Kortum, and Kramarz (2011), who use a simulated method of moments estimator to estimate
the parameters of a trade model featuring micro-level heterogeneity from the performance of
French exporters.
5.4. Performance on Simulated Data
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our estimation approach using simulated data
when we know the true value of θ.
Table 3 presents the results from the following exercise. We generate two sets of artiﬁcial data
on trade ﬂows and disaggregate prices with true values of θ that are equal to 8.28 and 4.00,
respectively, and then we apply our estimation routine.11 We repeat this procedure 100 times.
Table 3 reports average estimates. The sequence of artiﬁcial data is the same for both the overi-
dentiﬁed case and the exactly identiﬁed case to facilitate comparisons across estimators.
The ﬁrst row presents the average value of our simulated method of moments estimate, which
is 8.29 with a standard error of 0.03. For all practical purposes, the estimation routine recovers
the true value of θ that generated the data. To emphasize our estimator’s performance, the next
two rows of Table 3 present the approach of EK (which also corresponds to the moments used).
Though not surprising given the discussion above, this approach generates estimates of θ that
are signiﬁcantly (in both their statistical and economic meaning) higher than the true value of
θ of 8.28. The ﬁnal two rows present the exactly identiﬁed case when we use only one moment
to estimate θ. In this case, we use β1. Similar to the overidentiﬁed case, the average value of
our simulated method of moments estimate is 8.24 with a standard error of 0.04. Again, this is
effectively the true value of θ.
The second column reports the results when the true value of θ is set equal to 4.00. The es-
timates using our estimator are 3.99 and 3.98 in the overidentiﬁed and the exactly identiﬁed
11To generate the artiﬁcial data set, we employ the same simulation procedure described in Steps 1-3 in Section
5.2 using the trade data from EK.
20Table 3: Estimation Results With Artiﬁcial Data
Estimation Approach True θ = 8.28 True θ = 4.00
Overidentiﬁed Mean Estimate of θ (S.E.) Mean Estimate of θ (S.E.)
SMM 8.29 (0.03) 3.99 (0.02)
Moment, β1 12.47 (0.05) 6.03 (0.03)
Moment, β2 15.20 (0.05) 7.34 (0.03)
Exactly Identiﬁed
SMM 8.24 (0.04) 3.98 (0.02)
Moment, β1 12.47 (0.05) 6.03 (0.03)
Note: In each simulation there are 19 countries, 150,000goods and 100 simulations performed. The
sequence of artiﬁcial data is the same for both the overidentiﬁed case and exactly identiﬁed case.
case, respectively. Similar to the previous results, these values are effectively the true value of
θ. Furthermore, the alternative approaches that correspond to the moments that we used in our
estimation are biased away from the true value of θ.
We also compare our estimation approach to an alternative statistical approach to bias reduc-
tion. Robson and Whitlock (1964) propose a way to reduce the bias when estimating the trun-
cation point of a distribution. This problem is analogous to estimating the trade cost from
price differences. This can be seen by inspecting the integral in (13) of Lemma 1. Robson and
Whitlock’s (1964) approach would suggest (in our notation) an estimator of the trade cost of
2ˆ τ1
ni − ˆ τ2
ni, or two times the ﬁrst-order statistic minus the second-order statistic. This makes in-
tuitive sense because it increases the ﬁrst-order statistic by the difference between the ﬁrst- and
second-order statistic. They show that this estimator is as efﬁcient as the ﬁrst-order statistic but
with less bias.12
We apply their approach to approximate the trade friction and then use it as an input into the
simple method of moments estimator. Table 4 compares the results from this estimation pro-
cedure to the results obtained using our SMM estimator. The second row reports the results
when using Robson and Whitlock’s (1964) approach to reduce the bias. This approach reduces
the bias relative to using the ﬁrst-order statistic (EK’s approach) reported in the third row. It is
not, however, a complete solution, as the estimates are still meaningfully higher than both the
true value of θ and the estimates from our estimation approach. Moreover, we should empha-
size Robson and Whitlock’s (1964) approach only appeal is its computational simplicity. The
12Robson and Whitlock (1964)provide more-general reﬁnements using inner-order statistics, but methods using
inner-order statistics will have very low efﬁciency. Cooke (1979) provides an alternative bias reduction technique
but only considers cases in which the sample size (L in our notation) is large.
21Table 4: Comparison to Alternative Statistical Approaches to Bias Reduction
True θ = 8.28 True θ = 4.00
Estimation Approach Mean Estimate of θ (S.E.) Mean Estimate of θ (S.E.)
SMM 8.29 (0.03) 3.99 (0.02)
Robson and Whitlock (1964) 10.54 (0.07) 5.11 (0.03)
Moment, β1 12.47 (0.05) 6.03 (0.03)
Note: In each simulation there are 19 countries, 150,000 goods and 100 simulations performed. The se-
quence of artiﬁcial data is the same for all cases.
fact that the approach does not depend on the explicit distributional assumptions is not a ben-
eﬁt because without these assumptions the model does not yield a gravity equation. Without
gravity, it is not clear what structural parameter is being estimated, which calls into question
the entire enterprise.
Overall, we view these results as evidence supporting our estimation approach and empirical
estimates of θ presented in Section 6 below.
6. Empirical Results
In this section, we apply our estimation strategy described in Section 5 to several different data
sets. The key ﬁnding of this section is that our estimation approach yields an estimate around
four, in contrast to previous estimation strategies, which yield estimates around eight.
6.1. Baseline Results Using New ICP 2005 Data
Our sample contains 123 countries. We use trade ﬂows and production data for the year 2004 to
construct trade shares. The price data used to compute aggregate price indices and proxies for
trade costs come from basic-heading-level data from the 2005 round of the International Com-
parison Programme (ICP).The datasethasbeenemployed ina numberofempirical studies. For
example, Bradford (2003) and Bradford and Lawrence (2004) use the ICP price data in order to
measure the degree of fragmentation, or the level of trade barriers, among OECD countries. In
addition, the authors provide an excellent description of the data-collection process.
The ICP collects price data on goods with identical characteristics across retail locations in
the participating countries during the 2003-2005 period.13 The basic-heading level represents
a narrowly-deﬁned group of goods for which expenditure data are available. The data set
contains a total of 129 basic headings, and we reduce the sample to 62 categories based on their
13The ICP Methodological Handbook is available at http://go.worldbank.org/MW520NNFK0.
22correspondence with the trade data employed. Appendix 1.2 provides more details.
On its own, this data set provides two contributions to the existing literature. First, because
this is the latest round of the ICP, the measurement issues are less severe than in previous
rounds. Furthermore, this data set provides very extensive coverage, as it includes as many as
123 developing and developed countries that account for 98 percent of world output.
The ICP provides a common list of “representative” goods whose prices are to be randomly
sampled in each country over a certain period of time. A good is representative of a country if
it comprises a signiﬁcant share of a typical consumer’s bundle there. Thus, the ICP samples the
prices of a common basket of goods across countries, where the goods have been pre-selected
due to their highly informative content for the purpose of international comparisons.
EK’s model gives a natural common basket of goods to be priced across countries. In this
model, agents in all countries consume all goods that lie within a ﬁxed interval, [0,1]. Thus, we
consider this common list in the simulated model and randomly sample the prices of its goods
across countries, in order to approximate trade barriers, much like it is done in the ICP data.
Table 5 presents the results.14 The ﬁrst row simply reports the moments that our estimation
procedure targets. As discussed, these values correspond with EK’s estimate of θ.
Table 5: Estimation Results With 2005 ICP Data
Estimate of θ (S.E.) β1 β2
Data Moments — 7.75 9.61
Exactly Identiﬁed Case 4.12 (0.02) 7.75 —
Overidentiﬁed Case 4.06 (0.01) 7.65 9.62
The second row reports the results for exactly identiﬁed estimation, where the underlying mo-
ment used is β1. In this case, our estimate of θ is 4.12, roughly half of EK’s estimate of θ.
The third row reports the results for the overidentiﬁed estimation. The estimate of θ is 4.06—
almost the sameasinour exactlyidentiﬁed estimation and, again, roughly halfofEK’sestimate.
The second and third columns report the resulting moments from the estimation routine, which
are close to the data moments targeted, given that only one parameter is used to match two
moments.
14The results from the Step 1 gravity regressions are presented in Table 12 and Table 15.
236.2. Estimates Using EK’s Data
In thissection, weapplyour estimation strategy to the samedata used inEKasanother checkof
our estimation procedure. Their data set consists of bilateral trade data for 19 OECD countries
in 1990 and 50 prices of manufactured goods for all countries. The prices come from a study
conducted by the OECD. It is these same data that were included in a round of the ICP in the
early 1990’s. Similar to our data, the price data are at the basic-heading level and are for goods
with identical characteristics across retail locations in the participating countries.
Table 6 presents the results.15 The ﬁrst row simply reports the moments that our estimation
procedure targets. The entry in the third column corresponds with β2, which is EK’s baseline
estimate of θ.
Table 6: Estimation Results With EK’s Data
Estimate of θ (S.E.) β1 β2
Data Moments — 5.93 8.28
Exactly Identiﬁed Case 3.93 (0.09) 5.93 —
Overidentiﬁed Case 4.42 (0.06) 6.64 8.10
The second row reports the results for exactly identiﬁed estimation, where the underlying mo-
ment used is β1. In this instance, our estimate of θ is 3.93, which is, again, roughly half of EK’s
estimate of θ. The standard error of our estimate is fairly tight.
The third row reports the results for the overidentiﬁed estimation. Here, our estimate of θ is
4.42. Again, this is substantially below EK’s estimate. Unlike our results in Table 5 with newer
data, the overidentiﬁed case seems to be giving a different value than the exactly identiﬁed case
gives. This contrasts with the Monte Carlo evidence, which suggests that the estimation pro-
cedure should not deliver very different estimates. Furthermore, comparing the data moments
in the top row versus the implied moments in the second and third columns of the third row
suggests that the estimation routine is facing challenges ﬁtting the observed moments. We view
this as pointing towards a problem with measurement error in the old data, as EK suggested.
6.3. Relation to Existing Literature
The elasticity of trade has been a focus of many studies. Below we discuss our method and
results in relation to alternatives in the literature. We focus our discussion ﬁrst on alternative
15The results from the Step 1 gravity regressions are presented in Table 13 and Table 15.
24procedures that use price variation to approximate trade frictions and then on gravity-based
estimators that use alternative proxies of trade frictions to estimate the trade elasticity.
EK provide a second estimate of the trade elasticity that amounts to 12.8.16 Our critique and
proposed solution apply to the estimator employed in this exercise as well. The critique applies
because the alternative estimation approach is based on the same measures of trade frictions
discussed above, which always underestimate the true trade friction. In Appendix C, we per-
form a Monte Carlo study where we ﬁnd that EK’s alternative methodology yields estimates
that are nearly 100 percent higher than the true elasticity. Then, we employ a simulated method
of moments estimator that minimizes the distance between the moments from EK’s alternative
approach on real and artiﬁcial data. We ﬁnd that the estimate of θ is 4.39, which is essentially
the same as our estimate in Table 6.
Donaldson (2009) estimates θ as well, and his approach is illuminating relative to the issues we
have raised. His strategy for approximating trade costs is to study differences in the price of salt
across locations in India. In principle, his approach is subject to our critique as well—i.e., how
could price differences in one good be informative about trade frictions? However, he argues
convincingly that in India, salt was produced in only a few locations and exported everywhere.
Thus, by examining salt, Donaldson (2009) ﬁnds a “binding good”. Using this approach, he
ﬁnds estimates in the range of 3.8-5.2, which is consistent with our range of estimates of θ.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) survey the literature on trade-elasticity estimates obtained
from gravity-based methods (which include EK’s approach) and they ﬁnd that the estimates
range between ﬁve and ten. Excluding EK’s results, the evidence cited in Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004) comes from two alternative estimation approaches. The ﬁrst uses second mo-
ments of changes in prices and expenditure shares, as in Feenstra (1994). The second uses the
gravity equation with direct measures of trade barriers (i.e. tariffs), as in Head and Ries (2001).
We discuss each of these approaches in turn below.
In Appendix D, we explore Feenstra’s (1994) method in the context of the Ricardian model. We
ﬁnd that Feenstra’s (1994) method, as well as papers that build on it such as Broda and Wein-
stein (2006), Imbs and Mejean (2010), and Feenstra, Obstfeld, and Russ (2010), does not recover
the elasticity of trade in the Ricardian model with micro-level heterogeneity. In particular, we
apply Feenstra’s (1994) method to data generated from the Ricardian model and we show that
the method recovers the utility parameter ρ that controls the elasticity of substitution across
goods; not the trade elasticity θ. This utility parameter plays no role in determining aggregate
trade ﬂows and welfare gains from trade in the Ricardian model.17 Hence, elasticity estimates
16Waugh (2010b) estimates the trade elasticity as well using EK’s benchmark approach and hence our critique
and solution applies to his approach as well.
17The parameter governs the elasticity of trade and welfare in models that do not feature micro-level hetero-
geneity such as the Armington model in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and Krugman’s (1980) model (see
25obtained using Feenstra’s (1994) approach should not be used in quantitative analysis of the
Ricardian model or other gravity-based international trade models with heterogeneity.18
The second set of estimates in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) are obtained using direct
measures of trade barriers in the gravity equation of trade. This methodology typically yields
estimates in the range of ﬁve to ten and above. The estimation approach is appealing because of
its simplicity and the appearance of being near assumption- and model-free, i.e. collect tariffs,
run the regression in (21), and read off the coefﬁcient on the tariff. However, this approach is
neither assumption- nor model-free and in addition it suffers from signiﬁcant data limitations.
First, in order to apply the estimation strategy that relies on tariff data to the Ricardian model
with micro-level heterogeneity, the model must be able to generate a gravity equation. Given
the model’s utility speciﬁcation, the assumption that productivity is drawn from a Fr´ echet dis-
tribution is crucial to obtain this result, as Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2011)
argue. Similarly, should one wish to apply any of the estimation strategies to monopolistic-
competition based models of heterogeneity, such as the framework of Melitz (2003), one would
need to parametrize productivities as in Chaney (2008) in order to derive a gravity equation
(see Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2011)). Hence, both our methodology and the
approach that uses observed changes in tariffs share the same parametric restrictions.
Second, estimation strategies that use tariff data have to make strong assumptions on the form
that both observable and unobservable components of trade frictions can take. For example,
Head andRies(2001)and Romalis(2007)assume that trade costs are symmetric, while Caliendo
and Parro (2011) use triple differences across countries to avoid imposing the trade-cost sym-
metry assumption. Moreover, all three studies must assume that the unobservable component
to trade frictions is uncorrelated with the observed component. This is likely to be violated
during a typical liberalization episode, during which both tariff and (unobserved) non-tariff
trade barriers fall. But, the magnitude of the change in the trade friction is critical to obtaining
an unbiased estimate of the trade elasticity. For example, depending on how non-tariff barriers
are controlled for in Head and Ries (2001), the estimate of the elasticity ranges from 11.4 to 7.9.
Overall, since the method assigns the entire change in trade ﬂows during trade liberalization to
the change in tariffs, it is not surprising that the resulting elasticity estimates are high.
Third, data limitations arise because one needs adequate measures of tariffs to identify the
elasticity from observed trade ﬂows. To satisfy this restriction, researchers have typically con-
centrated on estimating the elasticity for the U.S., Canada, and other rich countries. It is not
clear whether these estimates are applicable when addressing important questions such as:
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2011)).
18Feenstra (2010) makes a similar argument in the context of the Melitz (2003) model when parametrized as in
Chaney (2008).
26How large are the welfare gains from trade for poor and developing countries?19 Our method,
in combination with a small sample of comparable price data, allows us to estimate the trade
elasticity for 123 countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the widest coverage across rich
and poor countries for which the trade elasticity has been estimated.
Admittedly, there is a substantial difference between the low values of the elasticity that our
approach yields and the high values obtained using tariff data. One piece of evidence in sup-
port of the values that we ﬁnd is that our results compare favorably with alternative estimates
of the productivity parameterθ that do not use gravity-based estimators. For example, estimates
of θ using ﬁrm-level sales data, as in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Eaton, Ko-
rtum, and Kramarz (2011), are in the range of 3.6 to 4.8—exactly in the range of values that we
ﬁnd. Burstein and Vogel (2009) estimate θ matching moments regarding the skill intensity of
trade and ﬁnd a value of ﬁve. The identifying source of variation in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and
Kortum (2003) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) is that ﬁrm level data suggest that there
is a lot of variation in productivity. The data in our paper is telling a similar story: price varia-
tion (once properly corrected) suggests that there is a lot of variation in productivity implying
a relatively low trade elasticity.
Finally, we want to point out that, like methods that use tariffs and the gravity equation, our
methodological approach is not speciﬁc to the Ricardian model. The methodology and the
moments that we use to estimate the trade elasticity within the Ricardian framework can be
derived from other trade models of heterogeneity that generate a gravity equation of trade.
The key distinction, however, is that even with the same data, different assumptions about the
particular model may give different estimates of the trade elasticity.
This point has broader implications in light of Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare’s
(2011) arguments. The authors argue that manytrade models yield the same welfare-gain equa-
tion in (6). Hence, given acommon estimator of the trade elasticity (perhapsone that usestariffs
and the gravity equation that the models generate), the welfare gains across different models
are the same. In contrast, our methodological approach provides a common estimator that is
gravity-based, butisnot triviallythe sameacross models. Thus, one canuse theestimator to test
the assumption that new models of heterogeneity have the same trade elasticity and therefore
the same welfare gains from trade.
19Two extensions of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) framework have focused on this question. Waugh (2010b)
shows that poor countries have the most to gain from international tradeand asymmetry in tradebarriersaccounts
for a third of cross-country income differences. Fieler (2010) argues that the trade elasticity for poor countries is
ﬁfty percent higher than the elasticity for rich countries, and that this difference affects the welfare gains from
trade. Our elasticity estimates (relative to EK’s) increase the welfare cost of asymmetries in trade frictions in
Waugh’s (2010b) analysis by over thirty percent. Contrary to Fieler’s (2010) ﬁndings, we ﬁnd evidence that trade
elasticities are similar or lower for poor countries relative to rich countries.
277. Robustness
Below we discuss some computational issues regarding the number of goods in the simulation
and measurement issues regarding the price data.
7.1. The Number of Goods
The estimation routine requires us to take a stand on the number of goods in the economy. We
argue that the appropriate way to view this issue is to ask: how many goods are needed to nu-
merically approximate the inﬁnite number of goods in the model? Thus, the number of goods
chosen should be judged on the accuracy of the approximation relative to the computational
cost. The choice of the number of goods should not be judged on the basis of how many goods
actually exist in the “real world” because this value is impossible to know or discipline.
To understand our argument, recall that our estimation routine is based on a moment condition
that compares a biased estimate from the data with a biased estimate using artiﬁcial data. In
Section 3.4, we argued that the bias depends largely on the expected value of the max over a
ﬁnite sample of price differences—i.e., the integral of the left-hand side of equation (13). Thus,
when we compute the biased estimate using artiﬁcial data, we are effectively computing this
integral via simulation.20 This suggests that the number of goods should be chosen in a way
that delivers an accurate approximation of the integral. Furthermore, a way to judge if the
number of goods selected delivers an appropriate approximation is to increase the number of
goods until the estimate of θ does not change too much.
Table 7 reports the results of this analysis. It shows how our estimate of θ varies as the num-
ber of goods in the economy changes, using the EK data and the 2005 ICP data. For the EK
data, notice that our estimates are relatively similar across all the different numbers of goods
employed, ranging from 4.14 to 3.93. Moreover, the estimates are effectively the same after the
number of goods is above 100,000, suggesting that this is a reasonable starting point.
The results obtained using the 2005 ICP data, which features 123 countries, vary more depend-
ing upon the number of goods used. While the change from 4.22 to 4.12 when going from
100,000 to 150,000 goods is numerically large, computational costs force our hand to settle on
150,000 as the number of goods in the economy.21
Table 7 also reports a side effect of using a low number of goods—zero trade ﬂows between
countries predicted by the model in places where we observe positive trade ﬂows in the data.
20An alternative estimation strategy would be to use different numerical methods to compute the integrals (13)
and then to adjust the EK estimator given this value.
21The reason is that 150,000 goods is near the maximum number of goods feasible while still being able to
execute the simulation routine in parallel on a multi-core machine, which allows a speed-up of just under a factor
of eight.
28Table 7: Results with Different # of Goods
Number of Goods 5,000 25,000 100,000 150,000∗
EK’s Data, Exactly Identiﬁed Case, ˆ θ 4.14 3.99 3.93 3.93
Fraction of Wrong Zeros 0.10 0.03 0.005 0.003
Fraction of Correct Zeros — — — —
2004 ICP Data, Exactly Identiﬁed Case, ˆ θ 5.54 4.67 4.22 4.12
Fraction of Wrong Zeros 0.46 0.31 0.21 0.18
Fraction of Correct Zeros 0.85 0.72 0.55 0.50
Table 7 reports the fraction of zeros that the model produces in instances where there are pos-
itive trade ﬂows observed in the data. With only 5,000 goods, using the 2005 ICP data set, in
almost half of the instances where trade ﬂows are observed in the data, the model generates a
zero. While not as severe, ten percent of positive trade ﬂows are assigned zeros with the EK
data. Results of this nature suggest increasing the number of goods to minimize the number of
wrong zeros, as well.
7.2. Measurement Issues
The price data that we employ in our benchmark analysis constitute the 2005 round of the ICP.
The latest ICP round represents the highest quality cross-country price data that are publicly
available. As discussed earlier, the goal of the ICP is to collect prices of comparable products in
retail locations around the world. Since the data are meant to be comparable across countries,
authors such as Bradford (2003) and Bradford and Lawrence (2004) have used it in order to
infer the degree of fragmentation, or the level of trade barriers, among different countries.
With this in mind, measurement error in price data is a general concern in empirical work.
Below, we discuss measurement error issues that relate to distribution costs, mark-ups, product
quality, and aggregation, and the possible biases they may introduce in our estimation. We
conclude that these sources of measurement error potentially affect our estimation in various
and different directions. Thus, in order to address them, one would need to take a stand on the
mechanism that potentially generates them and incorporate it in the estimation procedure. The
advantage of our simulation-based estimator that relies on a model is that it can accommodate
these extensions. Below, we preview how various mechanisms may affect the results and we
offer further avenues of research on this topic.
29Random MeasurementError. In our estimation, non-systematic measurement error in the data
(mean-zero measurement error) may artiﬁcially generate larger maximal price differences than
implied by the underlying model. This would result in estimates of θ that are biased down-
wards. To address this issue, one can take a stand on the form of measurement error, introduce
the simulated measurement error into the artiﬁcial data set, and potentially estimate it jointly
with the trade elasticity. While we feel that a formal treatment of this issue is beyond the scope
of this paper, we performed Monte Carlo experiments with additive log-normal measurement
error. We found that the magnitude of measurement error needed to affect our results was
extreme.
Distribution Costs and Markups. The price data used in our estimation were collected at the
retail level. These prices may reﬂect local distribution costs, sales taxes, and mark-ups. As long
as the frictions are multiples over marginal costs of production and they are country- but not
good-speciﬁc, they will not affect our estimates of the elasticity parameter. Mathematically, one
can see this by noting that any multiplicative country-speciﬁc effect cancels out in the denom-
inator of equation (12). This is an important reason for using β as a moment in our estimation
routine rather than some other moment.
What if these effects are not multiplicative? For example, Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003)
present a model where distribution margins over tradable goods are additive. To understand
the effects of additive distribution margins, we carry out the experiment described in Section
4: we simulate trade ﬂows and samples of micro-level prices under a known θ and then we
introduce additive distribution costs to understand the bias that these effects may introduce.
These Monte Carlo experiments show that the bias in β relative to θ is larger than in the cases
when additive distribution costs are not present. The reason is because additive distribution
costs increase low prices proportionally more then high prices, thus the maximum price differ-
ence is smaller than it would be otherwise. Because of the strong monotonicity between β and
θ, this suggests that incorporating additive distribution costs to the estimation would make our
estimates of θ even lower.
Mark-ups that are not only country-, but also ﬁrm/retailer-speciﬁc is an important issue that is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, Simonovska and Waugh (2011) applies the estimator
proposed in this paper to Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum’s (2003) Ricardian framework
which has ﬁrm- and country-speciﬁc markups. An interesting feature of this analysis is that
while both Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and EK yield the same formula for the
welfare gains from trade (see Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2011)), viewing the
price data in light of the Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and our estimation proce-
dure may yield different estimates for the elasticity of trade than EK. Hence different models
with different micro-market structures may have different welfare gains from trade.
30Aggregation. The basic-heading price data employed in our analysis are disaggregated; but,
they are not at the individual-good level. For example, a price observation titled “rice” contains
the average price across different types of rice sampled, such as basmati rice, wild rice, whole-
grain rice, etc. Suppose that basmati rice is the binding good for a pair of countries. In the ICP
data, we compute the difference between the average price of rice between the two countries,
which is smaller than the price difference of basmati rice, if the remaining types of rice are
more equally priced across the two countries. In this case, trade barriers are underestimated
and, consequently, the elasticity of trade is biased upwards.
In order to alleviate the aggregation problem, Table 8 presents estimates of the elasticity pa-
rameter using EIU’s good-level price data set, which spans a subset of 77 countries from our
original data set, but provides prices for 111 individual tradable goods in two types of retail
stores. The results from the Step 1 gravity regressions are presented in Table 14 and Table 15.
Table 8: Estimation Results With EIU Data
Estimate of θ (S.E.) β1 β2
Cheap Stores
Data Moments — 4.17 5.11
Exactly Identiﬁed Case 2.47 (0.02) 4.17 —
Overidentiﬁed Case 2.48 (0.02) 4.19 5.09
Expensive Stores
Data Moments — 4.39 5.23
Exactly Identiﬁed Case 2.60 (0.02) 4.39 —
Overidentiﬁed Case 2.54 (0.02) 4.29 5.21
Table 8 suggest that aggregation causes a downward bias on trade-barrier estimates, resulting
in trade-elasticity estimates that are biased upwards. Indeed, when we use the highly disaggre-
gate EIU dataset, the elasticity of trade falls to 2.47-2.60.
Table 8 also reports the estimates for cheap and expensive stores as reported in the EIU dataset.
The estimates are very similar despite the very different stores from which the price data are
collected. A conclusion from this ﬁnding is that retail-speciﬁc markups within a country—
which would presumably characterize the difference between the two types of stores—are not
systematically biasing the results in a meaningful way.
Varying Product Quality. Although the explicit goal of price collection enterprises such as the
ICP and the EIU is that comparable products are priced across countries, one may be concerned
31that the prices used in the estimation reﬂect varying quality levels.
To address this concern, we engage in two exercises. The ﬁrst involves the EIU data. This
dataset features prices of comparable goods across countries collected in two different retail
locations: high-end stores and low-end stores. It is reasonable to assume that prices collected
in a particular store type across countries are more comparable to each other than prices col-
lected in different types of stores. Hence, in Table 8 above, we provide our estimates of the
elasticity using each subsample. The estimates are very similar across the two exercises, which
is reassuring of our results.
The second exercise that we perform involves the ICP data. In particular, we estimate the trade
elasticity using the 2005 trade and ICP price data for the subset of nineteen developed OECD
countries that EK considered in their original analysis. The presumption here is that should
there exist systematic differences in product quality across countries, they will be minimized
within this sample of developed and more homogeneous economies.
EK’s method of moments estimator for this subset of countries yields an estimate of 7.19. Our
simulated method of moments estimator yields an estimate of 5.51 with a standard error of
0.11. This value remains on the lower end of the estimates that prevail in the existing literature.
The reason why the value is higher than our benchmark estimate is because, in 2005, OECD
countries were more open relative to non-OECD countries as well as relative to their own 1990
counterparts. Hence, the bias associated with EK’s estimation approach is lower when trade
barriersare lower(recall Figure 1). Aninteresting pointofcomparison arenon-OECDcountries.
The EK method of moments estimator for this subset is 8.31—larger than the OECD estimate.
Yet, our simulated method of moments estimator yields an estimate of 4.09, which is lower than
the OECD sub-sample. This is again because non-OECD countries are less open and thus the
bias correction is lager.
We conclude that various sources of measurement error potentially affect our estimation in
different directions. Thus, there would not be one particular bias in our estimate if we had
incorporated all of these features into our estimation. However, an advantage of our estimation
approach is that future research on this topic can accommodate these extensions and evaluate
their potential effects.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we develop a new methodology to estimate the elasticity of trade that builds
on the Ricardian model of international trade with micro-level heterogeneity. We apply our
estimator to novel disaggregate price and trade-ﬂow data for the year 2004, which spans 123
countries that account for 98 percent of world output. Across numerous exercises, we obtain
estimates of the trade elasticity that range between 2.47 to 5.51. These values are both lower
32and fall within a narrower range relative to the existing literature. Our ﬁndings imply that the
measured welfare gains from international trade are twice as high as previously documented.
More importantly, the methodology and the moments that we use to estimate the trade elastic-
ity within the Ricardian framework can be derived from other trade models of heterogeneity
that generate a gravity equation of trade. The key distinction, however, is that even with the
same data, different assumptions about the particular model may give different estimates of
the trade elasticity.
This point has broader implications in light of Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare’s
(2011) arguments. The authors argue that different trade models yield the same welfare-gain
equation. Hence, given a common estimator of the trade elasticity, the welfare gains across
different models are the same. In contrast, our methodological approach provides a common
estimator that is gravity-based, but is not trivially the same across models. Thus, one can use
the estimator to test the assumption that new models of heterogeneity have the same trade
elasticity and therefore the same welfare gains from trade.
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35A. Data Appendix
1.1. Trade Shares















Putting the numerator and denominator together is simply computing an expenditure share by
dividing the value of goods country n imported from country i by the total value of goods in
country n. The home trade share Xnn
Xn is simply constructed as the residual from one minus the
sum of all bilateral expenditure shares.
To construct
Xni
Xn , the numerator is the aggregate value of manufactured goods that country n
imports from country i. Bilateral trade-ﬂow data are from UN Comtrade for the year 2004. We
obtain all bilateral trade ﬂows for our sample of 123 countries at the four-digit SITC level. We
then used concordance tables between four-digit SITC and three-digit ISIC codes provided by
the UN and further modiﬁed by Muendler (2009).22 We restrict our analysis to manufacturing
bilateral trade ﬂows only—namely, those that correspond with manufacturing as deﬁned in
ISIC Rev.#2.
The denominator is gross manufacturing production minus manufactured exports (for only
the sample) plus manufactured imports (for only the sample). Gross manufacturing produc-
tion data are the most serious data constraint we faced. We obtain manufacturing production
data for 2004 from UNIDO for a large sub-sample of countries. We then imputed gross man-
ufacturing production for countries for which data are unavailable as follows: We ﬁrst obtain
2004 data on manufacturing (MVA) and agriculture (AVA) value added, as well as population
size (L) and GDP for all countries in the sample. We then impute the gross output (GO) to







= β0 + βGDPCGDP + βLCL + βMV ACMV A + βAV ACAV A + ǫ,
where βx is a 1x3 vector of coefﬁcients corresponding to Cx, an Nx3 matrix which contains
22The trade data often report bilateral trade ﬂows from two sources. For example, the exports of country A
to country B can appear in the UN Comtrade data as exports reported by country A or as imports reported by
country B. In this case, we take the report of bilateral trade ﬂows between countries A and B that yields a higher
total volume of trade across the sum of all SITC four-digit categories.
36[log(x),(log(x))2,(log(x))3] for the sub-sample of N countries for which gross output data are
available.
1.2. Prices
The ICP price data we employ in our estimation procedure is reported at the basic-heading
level. A basic heading represents a narrowly-deﬁned group of goods for which expenditure
data are available. For example, basic heading “1101111 Rice” is made up of prices of different
types of rice, and the resulting value is an aggregate over these different types of rice. This
implies that a typical price observation of ”Rice” contains different types of rice, as well as
different packaging options that affect the unit price of rice within and across countries.
According to the ICP Handbook, the price of the basic heading ”Rice” is constructed using a
transitive Jevons index of prices of different varieties of rice. To illustrate this point, suppose
that the world economy consists of three countries, A,B,C and ten types of rice, 1-10. Further
suppose that consumers in country A have access to all 10 types of rice; those in country B only
have access to types 1-5 of rice; and those in country C have access to types 4-6 of rice. Although
all types of rice are not found in all three countries, it is sufﬁcient that each pair of countries
shares at least one type of rice.
TheICPobtainsunitpricesforallavailabletypesofrice inallthree countries andrecords aprice
of 0 if the type of rice is not available in a particular country. The relative price of rice between
countries A and B, based on goods available in these two countries, p
A,B
AB , is a geometric average












Similarly, one can compute the relative price of rice between countries A and C (B and C) based
on varieties available in both A and C (B and C). The price of the basic heading ”Rice” reported

















which is a geometric average that features not only relative prices of rice between countries
A and B, but also cross-prices between A and B linked via country C. This procedure ensures
that prices ofbasicheadingsare transitive across countries andminimizesthe impactof missing
prices across countries.
Thus, a basic-heading price is a geometric average of prices of varieties that is directly compa-
37rable across countries.
B. Proofs
Below, we describe the steps to proving Lemmata 1 and 2. The key part in Lemma 1 is deriving
the distribution of the maximal log price difference. We then prove Propositions 1 and 2.
2.1. Proof of Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Proposition 1
First, we derive the distribution of the maximal log price difference. The key insight is to work
with direct comparisons of goods’ prices (i.e., do not impose equilibrium and work from the
equilibrium price distribution) and to compute the distribution of log price differences and then
the distribution of the maximal log price difference.
Having obtained the distribution of the maximum log price difference, we show that the ex-
pected value of the maximum log price difference is biased in a ﬁnite sample and the estimator
ˆ β is biased.
2.1.A. Preliminaries
In deriving the distribution of maximum log price differences, we will work with a relabeling
of the production functions and exponential distributions following an argument in Alvarez
and Lucas (2007). They relate the pdfs of the exponential and Fr` echet distributions. The claim





i ). To see this, notice that since yi = h(zi)
is a decreasing function, it must be that f(zi)dzi = −g(yi)dyi, where f,g are the pdf’s of zi,yi,
respectively. The result will allow us to characterize moments of the log price difference by
invoking properties of the exponential distribution.
2.1.B. Proof of Lemma 1







k )−θ) be the productivity associated with good z, drawn from the Fr` echet
pdf in country k. By the argument above, the underlying distribution of zk is exponential. The
price for good z produced in country k and supplied to country i is pik ≡ wkτikz
1
θ
k . The relative









































We want to characterize the distribution of (b.2), so we will ﬁrst derive the pdf’s of its com-
ponents. Deﬁne ˜ zik = wθ
kτθ










Next, we derive the distribution of ˜ zi ≡ mink =n[wθ
kτθ
ikzk] = mink =n[˜ zik]. Since each ˜ zik ∼ exp(˜ λik)
and independent across countries k, ˜ zi ∼ exp(
 
k =n ˜ λik). Deﬁne ˜ λi ≡
 
k =n ˜ λik. Repeat the
procedure for importer n in the numerator.















Deﬁne ǫni(z) = log(vni(z)). Taking logs of expression (b.3) gives:
θǫni(z) = min{log(˜ zn),[θlog(wi) + θlog(τni) + log(zi)]} (b.4)
− min{log(˜ zi),[θlog(wn) + θlog(τin) + log(zn)]}.
Next, we argue that θǫni(z) ∈ [−θ log(τin),θlog(τni)]. For any good z, θǫni(z) can satisfy one and
only one of the following three cases:
1. Countries n and i buy good z from two different sources. Then,
θǫni(z) = log(˜ zn) − log(˜ zi) (b.5)
2. Country n buys good z from country i. Assuming that trade barriers don’t violate the
triangle inequality, it must be that i buys the good from itself. Then,
θǫni(z) = θlog(wi) + θlog(τni) + log(zi) − θlog(wi) − log(zi) = θlog(τni). (b.6)
3. Country i buys good z from n. Then it must be that n buys the good from itself, so:
θǫni(z) = θlog(wn) + log(zn) − θlog(wn) − θlog(τin) − log(zn) = −θlog(τin). (b.7)
We claim that the following ordering occurs: −θ log(τin) ≤ log(˜ zn)−log(˜ zi) ≤ θlog(τni). To show
this, we need to consider the following two scenarios:
391. Countries n and i buy good z from the same source k. Then,









= θ(log(τnk) − log(τik)). (b.8)
Clearly,
θ(log(τnk) − log(τik)) ≥ −θlog(τin) ⇐⇒ τinτnk ≥ τik,
where the latter inequality is true under the triangle inequality assumption.
Similarly,
θ(log(τnk) − log(τik)) ≤ θlog(τni) ⇐⇒ τnk ≤ τniτik,
again true by triangle inequality.
2. Country n buys good z from source a and country i from source b, a  = b. We want to show

























To ﬁnd the upper bound, take logs of (b.9) and subtract log(wθ
bτθ


















It sufﬁces to show that the right-hand side is itself below the upper bound since, by tran-










⇐⇒ θlog(τnb) − θlog(τib) ≤ θlog(τni)
⇐⇒ τnb ≤ τniτib, (b.12)
which is true by triangle inequality.
The argument for the lower bound is similar. Take logs of (b.10), multiply by −1 (and
40reverse inequality) and add log(wθ
aτθ


















It sufﬁces to show that the right-hand side is itself above the lower bound since, by tran-









iaza) ≥ −θ log(τin)
⇐⇒ θlog(τna) − θlog(τia) ≥ −θlog(τin)
⇐⇒ τinτna ≥ τia, (b.14)
which is true by triangle inequality.
Hence, θǫni(z) ∈ [−θlog(τin),θlog(τni)].
Next, we proceed to derive the distribution of θǫni(z) = log(˜ zn) − log(˜ zi). First, we derive the
pdfs of its two components.
Let yi ≡ log(˜ zi). Then ˜ zi = exp(yi). The pdf of yi must satisfy:
f(yi)dyi = g(˜ zi)d˜ zi ⇒ f(yi) = ˜ λi exp(−˜ λi˜ zi)
d˜ zi
dyi
⇒ f(yi) = ˜ λi exp(−˜ λi exp(yi))exp(yi)
⇒ F(yi) = 1 − exp(−˜ λi exp(yi)) (b.15)
The same holds for n.
Now that we have the pdf’s of the two components, we can deﬁne the pdf of ǫ ≡ θǫni(z) ∈
[−θ log(τin),θlog(τni)] as follows:
f(ǫ) ≡ fyn−yi(x) =
  ∞
−∞
fyn(y)fyi(y − x)dy, (b.16)
where we have used the fact that yn and yi are independently distributed hence, the pdf of their
difference is the convolution of the pdfs of the two random variables.




˜ λn exp(−˜ λn exp(y))exp(y)˜ λiexp(−˜ λi exp(y − ǫ))exp(y − ǫ)dy
=
−˜ λn˜ λi
(˜ λn exp(ǫ) + ˜ λi)2


˜ λn exp(y + ǫ) + ˜ λi exp(y) + exp(ǫ)
exp
 











0 + 0 + exp(ǫ)
exp{0}
= exp(ǫ) (b.18)





˜ λn exp(y + ǫ) + ˜ λi exp(y)
exp
 
exp(y)(˜ λn + ˜ λi exp(−ǫ))
 
exp(y)(˜ λn + ˜ λi exp(−ǫ))
= lim
y→∞
˜ λn exp(ǫ) + ˜ λi
exp
 
exp(y)(˜ λn + ˜ λi exp(−ǫ))
 




˜ λn˜ λi exp(ǫ)
(˜ λn exp(ǫ) + ˜ λi)2 (b.20)
The corresponding cdf is:
F(ǫ) =1 −
˜ λi
˜ λn exp(ǫ) + ˜ λi
(b.21)





−1 ˜ λn˜ λi exp(ǫ)




˜ λn exp(θlog(τni)) + ˜ λi
+
˜ λi
˜ λn exp(−θlog(τin)) + ˜ λi
(b.23)






Now that we have these distributions, we compute order statistics from them, which allow us
to characterize the trade barriers estimated from price data. We use the following result: Given
L observations drawn from pdf h(x), the pdf of the r-th order statistic (where r = L is the max
42and r = 1 is the min) is:
hr(x) =
L!




The pdf of the max reduces to:
hmax(x,L) =LH(x)
L−1h(x)







Recall that we are interested in computing the expectation of the maximum logged price dif-
ference between countries n and i. But, so far, we have derived the truncated pdf and cdf of
ǫ = θlog(vni(z)). Our object of interest is actually log(vni(z)) = 1
θǫ. The expectation of this object,
which represents the maximum log price difference, for L draws, is given by:
E[max
z∈L
(log(pn(z)) − log(pi(z)))] =
1
θ















−1 ˜ λn˜ λi exp(ǫ)
(˜ λn exp(ǫ) + ˜ λi)2 (b.28)
Hence, the expectation of the maximum of the log price difference is proportional to 1/θ, where
the proportionality object comes from gravity,
E[max
z∈L
(log(pn(z)) − log(pi(z)))] = Ψni(L;S, ˜ τi, ˜ τn), (b.29)
where:
Ψni(L;S, ˜ τi, ˜ τn) ≡
1
θ
  θ log(τni)
−θ log(τin)
ǫfmax(ǫ,L)dǫ, (b.30)
and the values S and ˜ τn correspond with the deﬁnitions outlined in Deﬁnition 1. It is worth
emphasizingthe nature of this integral: Other than the scalar in the front, itdependscompletely
on objects that can be recovered from the standard gravity equation in (21).
43Finally, one can rewrite equation (b.30) via integration by parts as:
E[max
z∈L
(log(pn(z)) − log(pi(z)))] = logτni −
1
θ





(log(pn(z)) − log(pi(z)))] +
1
θ
  θ log(τni)
−θ log(τin)
Fmax(ǫ,L)dǫ, (b.32)
which implies the following strict inequality:
logτni > E[max
z∈L
(log(pn(z)) − log(pi(z)))] = Ψni(L;S, ˜ τi, ˜ τn), (b.33)
where the strict inequality simply follows from the inspection of the CDF Fmax(ǫ,L) which has
positive mass below the point θlog(τni). This then proves claim 1. in Lemma 1.
To prove claim 2. in Lemma 1, we compute the difference in the expected values of log prices
between two countries. We show that they are equal to the (scaled) difference in the price
parameters Φ.
Rather than working with the distribution described above, it is more convenient to directly
compute the expectation of log prices using the equilibrium price distribution. Note that EK
showthatthecdfandpdfofpricesincountry iareG(p) = 1−exp(−Φipθ)andg(p) = pθ−1θΦi exp(−Φipθ),
respectively.





Substituting the pdf of prices and then utilizing some algebra to ﬁnd an appropriate change in













Our change of variables will set x = log(p), which yields dx/dp = 1/p. Then, integration by














































{γ + log(Φi)}, (b.35)
where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. Finally, using (b.35) and taking the expected dif-
ference in log prices between country n and country i, the scaled Euler-Mascheroni constant
cancels between the two countries and leaves the following expression
E[log(pn(z))] − E[log(pi(z))] = −
1
θ
{log(Φn) − log(Φi)} (b.36)
≡ Ωni(S, ˜ τn, ˜ τi),
which then proves claim 2. in Lemma 1.
2.1.C. Proof of Lemma 2 and Proposition 1



















Given the assumption that the trade data are ﬁxed, equation (b.37) is linear in the random

































by substituting in for the expectation of the maximum log price difference using (b.30), and
the difference in expectations of log prices using (b.36). Inspection of the bracketed term above






















with the reason being that Ψni(L) < logτni from Lemma 1; otherwise, the bracketed term would
correspond exactly with equation(5)inlogs and, thus, equalone. Now, inverting theexpression





























with the strict inequality following from (b.38) and (b.39). This proves Proposition 1.
2.2. Proof of Proposition 2
In this subsection, we prove Proposition 2. To prove the claims in Proposition 2, we start with
claim 1.
To prove claim 1., we argue that the sample maximum of scaled log price differences is a consis-
tent estimator of the scaled trade cost. In particular, we argue that as the sample size becomes
inﬁnite, the probability that the sample scaled trade cost is arbitrarily close to the true scaled
trade cost is one.










The cdf of this random variable is the integral of its pdf, which is given in expression (b.28),
over the compact interval in which the scaled logged price difference lies, [−θlogτin,θlogτni].
Denote this cdfbyF L
max. From (b.28), F L
max ≡ (FT)L, where FT isthe truncated distribution ofthe
scaled log price difference over the domain [−θlogτin,θlogτni]. By deﬁnition, FT and F L
max take
on values between zero and one, as they are cdfs. In particular, for any realization x < θlogτni,
46FT(x) < 1. For any L > 1, F L
max(x) = (FT(x))L ≤ FT(x) < 1.
Take L → ∞. Then, for any x ∈ [−θlogτin,θlogτni), F L
max = (FT)L becomes arbitrarily close to
zero since FT < 1. Hence, all the mass of the cdf F L
max becomes concentrated at θlogτni. Thus, as
the sample size becomes inﬁnite, the estimated scaled trade barrier converges to the true scaled











(logpn(ℓ) − logpi(ℓ)) = logτni. (b.42)
This proves claim 1. of Proposition 2.
To show consistency of the estimator ˆ β, we argue that
plim
L→∞
ˆ β (L;S, ˜ τ,X) = θ, (b.43)





  ˆ β (L;S, ˜ τ,X) − θ  < δ
 
= 1. (b.44)
Basically, we will argue that, by sampling the prices of an ever-increasing set of goods and
applying the estimator β over these prices, with probability one, we will obtain estimates that
are arbitrarily close to θ.
Inverting the expression for the estimator ˆ β in expression (12), rearranging, and multiplying






















  . (b.45)
By assumption, the denominator is trade data and is not a random variable.
In the numerator, log ˆ Pn −log ˆ Pi is the difference in the average of logged prices for countries n
and i, given a sample of L goods. In particular,











We refer the reader to Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) for a proof of the well known result
that the sample average is both an unbiased and consistent estimator of the mean. Since the
difference operator is continuous, the difference in the sample average of logged price is an
unbiased and consistent estimator of the difference in mean logged prices. Finally, multiply-
47ing these sample averages by a scalar θ, a continuous operation, ensures convergence to true
difference in the price terms Φ.
We have argued that the two components in the numerator converge in probability to their true
parameter counterparts, as the sample size becomes inﬁnite. Taking the difference of these two







































































  . (b.47)
To complete the argument, consider the log of expression (5), which involves Φ. Summing this















(θlogτni − [logΦi − logΦn]). (b.48)
Substituting expression (b.48) in the denominator of (b.47) above makes the fraction in that
expression equal to unity. Hence, 1/ˆ β converges to 1/θ in probability. Since, for β ∈ (0,∞), 1/ˆ β
is a continuous function of ˆ β, ˆ β converges to θ in probability. This proves claim 2. of Proposition
2.
Claim 3. of Proposition 2 follows from the fact that ˆ β is a consistent estimator of θ (see Hayashi
(2000) for a discussion).
2.3. Deriving the Inverse Marginal Cost Distribution
To simulate the model, we argue that by using the coefﬁcients S estimated from the gravity
regression (21), we have enough information tosimulate pricesand trade ﬂows. The key insight
is that the S’s are sufﬁcient to characterize the inverse marginal cost distribution. Thus, we can
sample from this distribution and then compute equilibrium prices and trade ﬂows.
To see this argument, let zi ∼ Fi(zi) = exp(−Tiz
−θ





i . To ﬁnd the pdf of the transformation ui, mi(ui), use the fact that
fi(zi)dzi = mi(ui)dui, or mi(ui) = fi(zi)(dui/dzi)−1. Let ˜ Si = Tiw
−θ
i . Using fi(zi), ˜ Si, and the fact

































































Clearly mi(ui) is the pdf that corresponds to the cdf Mi(ui) = exp(−˜ Siu
−θ
i ), which concludes the
argument.
C. EK’s Alternative Estimators of θ
EK use two other alternative methods to estimate θ than the one described in the main body
of the paper. Through these alternative methods they are able to establish a range from 3.6 to
12.86. In this section, we explore the properties of one of these alternative estimators. We show
that the estimator associated with the estimate of 12.86 is biased by economically meaningful
magnitudes for the same reasons as the estimator discussed in the paper. Similar to our earlier
arguments, we then use the moments associated with the biased estimator as the basis for our
estimation. Doing so allows us to establish a range from 3.6 to 4.3 with EK’s data rather than
the range between 3.6 and 12.86.
Before proceeding, we should note that we have little to say about EK’s estimation approach
that leads to an estimate of 3.6. To arrive at this estimate, they use wage data and proxies for
the productivity parameters, T, and ﬁnd a value of 3.6.23 While one may have objections to the
particular statistics that they employ, the resulting estimate is in line with the estimates that we
obtain, which we view as reassuring.
23Similarly, Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2011) estimate θ using trade data and proxies for productiv-
ity at the industry level for 21 developed countries. They provide a wide range of estimates depending on the
speciﬁcation, with a preferred estimate of 6.53.
493.1. EK’s 2SLS Approach
EK propose an alternative estimator for θ that uses the same variation in price data discussed







where log ˆ τni(L) = max
ℓ∈L
{logpn(ℓ) − logpi(ℓ)},






to proxy trade costs in the gravity equation (21). By using this measure in the gravity equation
(rather than using distance and ﬁxed effects), they can then interpret the coefﬁcient on Dni as
an estimate of the trade elasticity.
When using (21) and (b.49) to approximate trade costs, EK are concerned about measurement
error, so they employ instrumental variables to alleviate this concern. Speciﬁcally, they use the
geography variables (distance, border, language) in (22) as instruments for Dni. The resulting
two stage least squares (2SLS) estimate of θ is 12.86.
3.2. A Monte Carlo Study of EK’s 2SLS Approach
Here we apply the same experiment described in Section 4: we simulate trade ﬂows and sam-
ples of micro-level prices under a known θ. Then, we apply EK’s 2SLS estimator to the artiﬁcial
data. We employ the same simulation procedure described in Steps 1-3 in Section 5.2 and we
estimate all parameters (except for θ) using the trade data from EK. We set the true value of θ
equal to 8.28. The sample size of prices is set to L = 50, which is the number of prices EK had
access to in their data set.
Table 9 presents the results. The ﬁrst row shows that the estimates using EK’s 2SLS approach
are almost 100 percent larger than the true θ of 8.28. Comparing theses results with the study
of the method of moment estimator in Table 1, the bias takes the same form, but in the 2SLS
approach the bias is signiﬁcantly larger (12.5 vs. 15.9). This suggests (and our estimation below
conﬁrms) that any difference between EK’s original results using method of moments vs. 2SLS
arises because of how the particular estimator interacts with the bias in the approximation of
the trade friction.
The next three rows show how these results change as the number of sampled prices increases.
Here increasing the sample size systematically reduces the bias similar to the method of mo-
50Table 9: Monte Carlo Results, EK’s 2SLS Approach, True θ = 8.28
Approach = 2SLS, Gravity Mean Estimate of θ (S.E.) Median Estimate of θ
50 sampled prices 15.9 (0.24) 15.6
500 sampled prices 10.5 (0.05) 10.4
5,000 sampled prices 8.72 (0.02) 8.73
50,000 sampled prices 8.33 (0.01) 8.33
Note: S.E. is the standard error of the mean. In each simulation there are 19 countries and 500,000
goods. 100 simulations performed.
mentresults in Table2. Thisshows thatthe keyproblem with EK’sapproach isnotthe estimator
per se, but, instead, the poor approximation of the trade costs. Once the sample size of prices
becomes large enough, trade costs are better approximated and the bias in the estimate of θ is
reduced.
Recall that the purpose of EK’s 2SLS estimator was to alleviate an error-in-variables problem.
However, 2SLS only works if the error-in-variables problem is classical in the sense that the
measurement error is mean zero. The issue identiﬁed in this paper is a situation where the
measurement error is not classical. The approximated trade friction always underestimates the
true trade friction and the approximation error is never mean zero, thus it is not obvious that
2SLS corrects the problem. In fact, the results in Table 9 suggest that 2SLS makes the bias in θ
worse when compared to alternative estimators.
3.3. Using EK’s 2SLS Estimates as a Basis For Estimation
The estimates from EK’s 2SLS approach can be used as the basis for our estimation rather than
the estimates from EK’s method of moments approach. Speciﬁcally, in the exactly identiﬁed
case, we compare the empirical moment from EK’s 2SLS estimation to the averaged simulation











Our estimation procedure is based on the same moment condition described in the main text:
E [y(θo)] = 0,
51where θo is the true value of θ. Thus, our simulated method of moments estimator is




where we abstract from the weighting matrix since we focus on the exactly identiﬁed case in
this section.
Table 10: Estimation Results: 2SLS Moments, EK Data
Estimate of θ (S.E.) β2SLS
Data Moments — 8.03
2SLS Moments, Exactly Identiﬁed 4.39 (0.86) 8.03
Table 10 presents the result using EK’s data. The ﬁrst row presents the data moments. Here the
estimate of β2SLS is 8.03. This differs from EK’s number of 12.86 only because we are using the
maximum price difference rather than the second order statistic used in EK. The second row
presents the estimate of θ which is 4.39, the standard error, and the model-implied moment.
Note that, while a very different moment is the basis of our estimation, the estimate is nearly
identical to the exactly identiﬁed results in Table 6, i.e. 4.39 vs. 4.42. On its own, this is a
reassuring result because it shows that alternative moments are giving similar answers. More-
over, it suggests that any difference between the results using method of moments vs. 2SLS
in EK arises primarily because of how the particular estimator interacts with the bias in the
approximation of the trade friction. Yet once this bias is corrected for, we ﬁnd similar results
independent of the particular moment used.
D. Feenstra’s 1994 Methodology in the Ricardian Model
In this section we analyze Feenstra’s (1994) method to estimate the elasticity of substitution
from cross-country data in the context of the Ricardian model. We show that Feenstra’s (1994)
method recovers the elasticity of substitution across goods, i.e. the ρ parameter in CES preferences.
It does not recover the θ parameter controlling the trade elasticity, i.e. how trade ﬂows change in
response to changes in trade costs and the welfare gains from trade. Thus, using the estimates
from Feenstra (1994) or Broda and Weinstein (2006) to calibrate the θ parameter in the Ricardian
model is inappropriate.
We show this result by asking the following question: given prices and shares generated from
the Ricardian model, what would Feenstra’s (1994) method recover — the θ or the ρ? To answer
52this question we will brieﬂy describe Feenstra’s (1994) method and its application to simulated
data from the Ricardian model. In the description, we will mainly follow Feenstra (2010).
First, we will deﬁne an individual variety in Feenstra’s (1994) language as a speciﬁc good j on
the zero-one interval. In the Ricardian model, the expenditure share for good j in country k at











which is the standard formula for expenditure shares from CES demand structures. Recall that
the prices p(j) and p(ℓ) are optimal, i.e. they correspond to the lowest cost producer. Aggregate
expenditure shares in (4) come from integrating (b.52) over country pair combinations.
Taking logs, differencing, and expressing the denominator (b.52) as a time ﬁxed effect yields
∆logs(j)kt = φt − (ρ − 1)∆logp(j)kt + ǫ(j)kt. (b.53)
The ﬁnal term ǫ(j)kt represents both trade cost shocks and productivity shocks that will gener-
ate variation in shares and prices across time/simulations. Equation (b.53) is the same equation
that Feenstra’s (1994) methodology exploits.
Feenstra (1994) introduces an upward sloping log-linear supply curve into the estimation of
(b.53). Deﬁne the “reduced form” supply elasticity as η.24 By differencing the supply and
demand equations with respect to a reference county i and then multiplying these equations
together (see Feenstra (2010)) he arrives at the following equations:
Ykt = θ1Xkt + θ2X2kt + ukt, (b.54)
24This raises an often overlooked conceptual issue as well. Modulo general equilibrium effects, the Ricardian
model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) or more generally the models of Krugman (1980) or Melitz (2003) do not have
upward sloping supply curves. In the Ricardian model this is clear. With constant returns to scale technologies
and perfect competition, ﬁrms price at marginal cost whether the quantity supplied is negligible or inﬁnite. This
is problematic because researchers typically take the estimated demand elasticity (that has an associated supply
elasticity) and use these estimates in models that do not have an upward-sloping supply curve. Thus, it is not
clear whether the change of quantities in response to a change in trade frictions implied by the estimation is the
same as that implied by the model.
53where
Ykt = (∆logp(j)kt − ∆logp(j)it)
2, (b.55)
X1kt = (∆logs(j)kt − ∆logs(j)it)
2, (b.56)
X1kt = (∆logp(j)kt − ∆logp(j)it)(∆logs(j)kt − ∆logs(j)it), (b.57)
θ1 =
ν
(ρ − 1)2(1 − ν)
, θ2 =
2ν − 1
(ρ − 1)2(1 − ν)
(b.58)
ukt is an error term composed of the shocks to the demand curve and the supply curve. Then
averaging these equations across time yields:
¯ Yk = θ1 ¯ X1k + θ2 ¯ X2k + ¯ uk. (b.59)
Equation (b.59) relates second moments of price and share changes that linearly depend on
demand and supply elasticities. Given the appropriate assumptions on the variances of the
error terms across countries and across demand and supply shocks, least squares estimates of
(b.59) are consistent. Finally, given the estimates of θ1 and θ2 one can recover the demand and
supply elasticity by using (b.58).
There is an important point to note here. First — and this should be clear from equations (b.58)
and (b.59) — Feenstra’s (1994) method can only speak to and recover the parameter ρ, which
our Monte-Carlo experiment conﬁrms below. This is an important observation because the
parameter ρ does not affect aggregate trade ﬂows or measures of the welfare gains from trade
in the Ricardian model.25
4.1. Monte-Carlo Study of Feenstra’s Method in the Ricardian Model
To further illustrate what Feenstra’s (1994) method recovers, we performed the following ex-
ercise: We simulated prices and expenditure shares for individual varieties from the Ricardian
model when calibrated as in Section 4. To generate time series variation we introduced trade
cost shocks, cost shocks, and measurement error in the prices. These shocks are independent
across time and countries. All the shocks are multiplicative and log normally distributed with
the mean of the associated normal distribution set equal to zero and a standard deviation pa-
rameter picked by us.
25We suspect that a similar result can be derived for the Melitz (2003) model as articulated in Chaney (2008)
because the aggregate trade elasticity there relates to the underlying shape parameter of the Pareto distribution of
ﬁrm productivity.
54Table 11: Estimates of Demand Elasticity, Feenstra’s Method
Mean Estimate Median Estimate
Model, θ = 4,ρ = 1.5 1.51 (0.001) 1.51
Model, θ = 4,ρ = 2.5 2.52 (0.003) 2.52
Model, θ = 8,ρ = 1.5 1.51 (0.001) 1.51
Model, θ = 8,ρ = 2.5 2.51 (0.004) 2.51
Note: In the simulation there are 19 countries with trade frictions and produc-
tivity parameters calibrated to ﬁt Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) data. 29 periods of
data were generated and used, which is consistent with the time series in Broda
and Weinstein (2006). Means and medians are over 100 simulations.
Given a sequence of prices and shares as described above we apply Feenstra’s (1994) method.
Mechanically we implement Feenstra’s (1994) method by estimating (b.59) by least-squares
while constraining θ1 > 0. This constraint ensures that the recovered demand elasticity is a
real number.
Table 11 presents the results for different θ’sand ρ’s. In all cases, the mean and medianelasticity
correspond essentially with the ρ parameter in the calibrated model. In no case does Feenstra’s
(1994) method correspond with the θ parameter in the model. Thus, Feenstra’s (1994) method
can only speak to and recover the parameter ρ.
As mentioned earlier, this observation is important because the parameter ρ does not affect ag-
gregate trade ﬂows or measures of the welfare gains of trade in the Ricardian model. Moreover,
this shows that using the estimates from Broda and Weinstein (2006) obtained by following
Feenstra’s (1994) method to calibrate the θ parameter in the Ricardian model is inappropriate.
55Table 12: 2005 ICP Data, Step 1 Country-Speciﬁc Estimates
Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E. Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E. Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E.
Angola −1.04 0.21 −2.67 0.35 Fiji −0.58 0.20 −2.06 0.31 Nepal 0.48 0.24 −3.00 0.32
Argentina 1.13 0.18 2.34 0.25 Finland 1.09 0.17 2.15 0.23 New Zealand −0.25 0.30 3.17 0.24
Armenia 0.83 0.20 −3.91 0.29 France 0.39 0.16 5.09 0.22 Nigeria −0.85 0.25 −1.00 0.29
Australia 0.24 0.16 3.59 0.23 Gabon −1.07 0.18 −1.52 0.27 Norway 0.33 0.37 1.88 0.23
Austria 0.39 0.16 2.71 0.22 Gambia, The −2.40 0.22 −2.32 0.34 Oman −0.19 0.36 −0.74 0.26
Azerbaijan −0.03 0.20 −2.76 0.28 Georgia −2.78 0.19 0.70 0.27 Pakistan 0.55 0.29 2.03 0.23
Bangladesh 0.76 0.18 0.46 0.24 Germany 0.40 0.16 5.57 0.22 Paraguay 0.04 0.36 −0.74 0.28
Belarus 1.27 0.18 −0.98 0.25 Ghana −1.32 0.21 0.44 0.29 Peru 0.47 0.24 1.10 0.25
Belgium −2.75 0.16 8.26 0.22 Greece 0.78 0.16 0.58 0.23 Philippines −0.34 0.39 2.64 0.24
Benin −0.62 0.22 −3.66 0.36 Guinea −1.76 0.22 −2.16 0.33 Poland 0.84 0.34 1.76 0.23
Bhutan 0.37 0.30 −5.45 0.43 Guinea-Bissau −0.40 0.28 −5.77 0.48 Portugal −0.20 0.24 2.71 0.23
Bolivia 0.28 0.19 −1.65 0.29 Hungary 0.86 0.17 0.98 0.23 Romania 0.60 0.25 0.75 0.23
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.14 0.23 −3.68 0.32 Iceland −0.26 0.18 −0.55 0.26 Russian Federation 1.32 0.34 2.12 0.23
Botswana 0.97 0.25 −3.73 0.37 India 0.94 0.16 3.53 0.25 Rwanda 0.09 0.27 −5.05 0.36
Brazil 1.30 0.16 3.67 0.23 Indonesia 1.34 0.16 3.07 0.23 Sierra Leone −0.97 0.25 −3.61 0.41
Brunei Darussalam 1.68 0.25 −5.15 0.37 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1.02 0.21 −0.85 0.28 Saudi Arabia 0.70 0.30 0.70 0.28
Bulgaria 0.30 0.17 0.39 0.24 Ireland −3.21 0.16 6.39 0.22 Senegal −0.86 0.27 −0.63 0.25
Burkina Faso 0.32 0.20 −4.07 0.31 Israel 0.59 0.17 1.70 0.24 Slovak Republic −0.31 0.26 1.34 0.23
Burundi −1.52 0.20 −3.12 0.34 Italy 0.58 0.16 4.56 0.22 Slovenia 1.02 0.38 −0.20 0.24
Cameroon 1.54 0.21 −3.34 0.30 Japan 1.51 0.16 4.89 0.23 South Africa 0.41 0.25 3.61 0.23
Canada −0.27 0.16 4.59 0.22 Jordan −0.25 0.18 −0.65 0.25 Spain 0.29 0.31 4.09 0.22
Cape Verde −0.37 0.21 −4.86 0.38 Kazakhstan 0.28 0.18 −0.03 0.26 Sri Lanka −0.14 0.42 0.65 0.25
Central African Republic 0.55 0.25 −4.67 0.36 Kenya −0.53 0.16 −0.07 0.23 Sudan −0.12 0.33 −3.47 0.32
Chad 0.54 0.24 −6.49 0.40 Korea, Rep. 1.04 0.16 4.38 0.22 Swaziland 2.10 0.38 −3.30 0.33
Chile 0.27 0.18 1.96 0.25 Kyrgyz Republic 0.03 0.20 −2.86 0.30 Sweden 0.75 0.31 3.34 0.22
China 1.13 0.16 5.74 0.23 Lao PDR 1.43 0.27 −3.92 0.35 Switzerland 0.10 0.25 3.69 0.27
Colombia 0.38 0.17 0.50 0.24 Latvia −0.46 0.19 −0.10 0.26 Syrian Arab Republic −0.34 0.31 −0.86 0.26
Comoros −0.84 0.27 −4.54 0.42 Lebanon 0.60 0.20 −2.29 0.28 Tajikistan 1.10 0.37 −3.19 0.34
Congo, Dem. Rep. −0.65 0.24 −2.31 0.34 Lesotho 1.09 0.30 −5.44 0.44 Tanzania −1.01 0.26 −1.41 0.31
Congo, Rep. −0.95 0.21 −1.08 0.30 Lithuania 0.67 0.21 −0.88 0.29 Thailand 0.86 0.29 3.57 0.28
Cte d’Ivoire 0.78 0.21 −1.22 0.30 Macedonia, FYR 0.41 0.18 −2.71 0.27 Togo −1.40 0.25 −1.34 0.27
Croatia 1.08 0.16 −1.29 0.24 Malawi −0.63 0.19 −2.59 0.28 Tunisia 0.34 0.36 −0.30 0.24
Cyprus −0.86 0.17 0.45 0.24 Malaysia −1.43 0.16 6.58 0.22 Turkey 0.93 0.28 2.38 0.23
Czech Republic 0.43 0.16 2.02 0.23 Mali −1.03 0.23 −2.66 0.32 Uganda −0.71 0.29 −2.30 0.26
Denmark −0.24 0.16 3.63 0.23 Mauritania −1.97 0.23 −1.79 0.33 Ukraine 1.41 0.24 0.88 0.28
Djibouti −2.04 0.24 −2.37 0.38 Mauritius −1.63 0.17 1.44 0.24 United Kingdom −0.29 0.32 5.59 0.22
Ecuador −0.24 0.18 0.12 0.26 Mexico 0.21 0.16 2.61 0.24 United States 0.06 0.34 6.87 0.22
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.44 0.17 0.62 0.23 Moldova −0.47 0.19 −2.12 0.29 Uruguay −0.51 0.29 1.40 0.27
Equatorial Guinea 0.47 0.24 −4.24 0.39 Morocco −0.39 0.17 1.32 0.23 Venezuela, RB 0.72 0.29 −0.60 0.26
Estonia −1.74 0.17 1.61 0.24 Mozambique −0.16 0.22 −2.06 0.33 Vietnam −0.44 0.24 2.69 0.28
Ethiopia −0.66 0.21 −2.15 0.31 Namibia 1.09 0.23 −3.64 0.33 Zambia −3.99 0.30 2.59 0.27
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6Table 13: EK Data, Step 1 Country-Speciﬁc Estimates
Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E. Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E.
Australia −0.20 0.15 0.54 0.24 Japan 2.54 0.13 1.74 0.21
Austria 0.50 0.12 −1.65 0.18 Netherlands −3.09 0.12 0.80 0.18
Belgium −4.38 0.12 0.98 0.18 New Zealand −1.42 0.15 0.37 0.24
Canada −0.46 0.13 1.06 0.22 Norway −0.34 0.12 −1.01 0.18
Denmark −1.16 0.12 −0.67 0.18 Portugal −0.28 0.12 −1.38 0.19
Finland 0.82 0.12 −1.33 0.18 Spain 1.56 0.12 −1.35 0.18
France 1.15 0.12 0.05 0.18 Sweden 0.05 0.12 −0.06 0.18
Germany 1.44 0.12 0.82 0.18 United Kingdom 0.52 0.12 0.89 0.18
Greece −0.38 0.12 −2.51 0.18 United States 1.34 0.13 2.83 0.22
Italy 1.81 0.12 −0.12 0.18
Table 14: EIU Data, Step 1 Country-Speciﬁc Estimates
Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E. Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E. Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E.
Argentina 0.71 0.17 0.74 0.24 Iceland −0.06 0.17 −3.09 0.24 Poland 0.56 0.16 0.26 0.23
Australia −0.23 0.16 2.19 0.24 India 0.54 0.16 1.76 0.24 Portugal −0.03 0.16 0.31 0.23
Austria 0.11 0.16 1.31 0.23 Indonesia 1.01 0.16 1.39 0.23 Romania 0.13 0.16 −0.42 0.23
Azerbaijan 0.06 0.17 −5.28 0.25 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.75 0.18 −2.71 0.26 Russian Federation 1.17 0.16 0.55 0.24
Belgium −2.79 0.16 6.16 0.23 Ireland −3.13 0.16 4.65 0.23 Saudi Arabia 0.22 0.18 −0.59 0.26
Brazil 0.59 0.16 2.33 0.23 Israel 0.08 0.17 0.37 0.24 Senegal −0.70 0.17 −3.76 0.25
Brunei Darussalam 1.59 0.21 −7.49 0.32 Italy 0.35 0.16 2.93 0.23 Slovak Republic −0.45 0.16 −0.21 0.23
Bulgaria 0.03 0.17 −1.23 0.24 Japan 1.09 0.16 3.49 0.23 South Africa 0.00 0.16 1.76 0.23
Canada −0.44 0.16 2.89 0.23 Jordan −0.81 0.17 −1.88 0.24 Spain 0.03 0.16 2.48 0.23
Central African Republic 0.69 0.21 −7.07 0.31 Kazakhstan 0.55 0.17 −2.45 0.24 Sri Lanka −0.25 0.17 −1.06 0.24
Chile −0.04 0.17 0.56 0.24 Kenya −0.65 0.16 −2.69 0.24 Sweden 0.42 0.16 1.86 0.23
China 0.71 0.16 4.04 0.23 Korea, Rep. 0.58 0.16 3.06 0.23 Switzerland −0.04 0.18 2.05 0.25
Colombia 0.11 0.16 −1.18 0.24 Malaysia −1.93 0.16 5.33 0.23 Syrian Arab Republic −0.41 0.17 −3.04 0.24
Cote d’Ivoire 0.80 0.18 −3.42 0.27 Mexico −0.23 0.16 1.43 0.24 Thailand 0.51 0.18 1.87 0.25
Czech Republic 0.05 0.16 0.68 0.23 Morocco −0.47 0.16 −0.65 0.23 Tunisia 0.10 0.16 −2.02 0.24
Denmark −0.37 0.16 1.74 0.23 Nepal 0.43 0.21 −5.07 0.28 Turkey 0.71 0.16 0.51 0.23
Ecuador −0.32 0.17 −1.84 0.24 New Zealand −0.62 0.17 1.75 0.24 Ukraine 1.52 0.18 −1.21 0.26
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.29 0.16 −1.30 0.23 Nigeria −1.02 0.18 −2.98 0.26 United Kingdom −0.38 0.16 3.71 0.23
Ethiopia −0.68 0.18 −4.15 0.27 Norway 0.35 0.16 0.00 0.23 United States −0.25 0.16 5.19 0.23
Finland 0.60 0.16 0.93 0.23 Oman −0.36 0.17 −2.94 0.25 Uruguay −0.53 0.18 −0.59 0.25
France 0.38 0.16 3.04 0.23 Pakistan 0.30 0.16 0.09 0.23 Venezuela, RB 0.85 0.17 −2.51 0.24
Germany 0.11 0.16 3.95 0.23 Paraguay −0.03 0.18 −3.03 0.26 Vietnam −0.37 0.18 0.63 0.26
Greece 0.33 0.16 −0.92 0.23 Peru 0.22 0.17 −0.73 0.24 Zambia −1.91 0.17 −1.84 0.26
Hungary 0.59 0.16 −0.17 0.23 Philippines −0.72 0.16 1.50 0.23
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7Table 15: Step 1 Trade Cost Estimates and Summary Statistics
Geographic Barriers ICP 2005 Data EK Data EIU Data
Barrier Parameter Estimate S.E. Parameter Estimate S.E. Parameter Estimate S.E.
[0,375) − 5.30 0.21 −2.89 0.14 −5.02 0.19
[375,750) − 6.29 0.14 −3.56 0.10 −5.28 0.11
[750,1500) − 7.27 0.09 −3.87 0.07 −5.71 0.07
[1500,3000) − 8.50 0.06 −4.10 0.15 −6.63 0.05
[3000,6000) − 9.65 0.04 −6.15 0.09 −7.70 0.04
[6000,maximum] −10.35 0.05 −6.60 0.10 −8.41 0.04
Shared border 1.25 0.12 0.44 0.14 1.04 0.16
Summary Statistics
ICP 2005 Data EK Data EIU Data
No. Obs 10,513 342 4,607
TSS 152,660 2,936 47,110
SSR 30,054 76.56 8,208
σ2
ν 2.93 0.25 1.84
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